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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Proliferation Issues**

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-94-009

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14 April 1994

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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**Qian Says Sanctions Put Beijing in 'Awkward Position'**

SK2903080394 Seoul YONHAP in English 0748 GMT  
29 Mar 94

[Text] Beijing, March 29 (YONHAP) —China expressed unprecedentedly deep concern over the situation on the Korean peninsula at the summit and foreign ministers' meetings with South Korea during President Kim Yong-sam's visit, a highly placed source close to the meetings said Tuesday.

"Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen told his South Korean counterpart Han Sung-chu that if the international community applied pressure on North Korea, then North Korea would have no choice but to take military action," the source said.

Qian was quoted as stressing China's belief that the situation should not be allowed to deteriorate and that dialogue among the countries concerned must continue.

Qian reportedly admitted that China would be put in an awkward position if North Korea were slapped with economic sanctions through a United Nations Security Council resolution.

The official quoted Qian as saying, "China does not want to see a UN observation party deployed at the Chinese border with North Korea to monitor whether economic sanctions on North Korea are being implemented."

Qian, adding that such action might trigger an exodus of North Koreans into China as well as compel North Korea into provoking a war, suggested that China would oppose economic sanctions against Pyongyang, the official said.

Meanwhile, Chinese President Jiang Zemin stressed at his summit with South Korean President Kim Yong-sam the "four-party, three-channel" solution—that is, resolution through three channels of talks between South and North Korea, between North Korea and the United States, and between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Jiang told South Korean journalists that if tension continued to mount on the Korean peninsula, the first to suffer would be the Korean people.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### DPRK Official Allegedly Told NSP Country Has Nuclear Bomb

SK2703052694 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean  
27 Mar 94 p 2

[Text] Mr. Yi Pok-hon (33, from Sinam 1-tong, Taegu), who was arrested on 8 March by the Agency for National Security Planning [NSP] on espionage charges and who was transferred to the prosecutor's office on 25 March, stated while being investigated: "It seems North Korea has succeeded in manufacturing nuclear bombs." This draws our attention as there is current suspicion regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons development.

The NSP disclosed this on 26 March when it transferred Mr. Yi Pok-hon to the prosecutor's office. Since he left the country in 1990, Mr. Yi has been engaged in spy activities overseas, in regions such as Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and China. Mr. Yi reportedly stated during the NSP investigation: When I went to North Korea in March 1993, a Mr. Ho, a senior North Korean Workers' Party cadre, asked me directly if it would be tactically advantageous to North Korea to announce openly its possession of a nuclear bomb or would it be better to keep it secret after the withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The NSP also disclosed that Mr. Yi said that Ho had told him that North Korea intends to deliver an atomic bomb, whose performance had not been tested, to a certain country in the Middle East sometime during 1994.

### DPRK Chemical Weapons May Have Infiltrated Into ROK

SK2803093194 Seoul MUNHWA ILBO in Korean  
28 Mar 94 p 6

[Text] On 28 March, Japanese SANKEI SHIMBUN published a report from Washington that (Neil Livingston,) an American expert in studies of terrorism, warned that there is a possibility that North Korea, when it invades the ROK again, will wage a harassing operation in the rear area of the ROK with chemical weapons which it has already hidden in the ROK.

According to SANKEI SHIMBUN, (Livingston) alleged this in an article entitled, "The Dangerous Area," contributed to a recent issue of the publication "Sea Power," published by the Navy League, an organization supported by the U.S. Navy.

Stressing that the North Korean leadership which triggered a war on the Korean peninsula on 25 June 40 years ago is the Kim Il-song system, (Livingston) said that "the ROK is very vulnerable to North Korean attack, and therefore, it is very clear that Seoul, the fourth largest city in the world approximately 60 km away from the

Military Demarcation Line [MDL], will undergo enormous damages at the initial stage, whatever type of war may break out there in the future."

He estimated that if the ROK Army fails to check the North Korean Army midway, the North Korean fighters will reach Seoul within five minutes and tanks will pressure Seoul in its outskirts within an hour.

In particular, he assumed that North Korea has stored an enormous quantity of chemical weapons in the areas near MDL in the North Korean side of the Armistice Line, and will likely blow off the poison gas to South Korea in an emergency by taking advantage of weather conditions, including wind, and that some of these chemical weapons might have already been hidden in secret places in Seoul or other areas of the ROK.

SANKEI SHIMBUN wrote that this suggests the possibility that armed spies, who will commit a terrorist act with chemical weapons at the directive from Pyongyang, might have already infiltrated into Seoul, or the forces that blindly follow North Korea might already possess these weapons.

### MINJU CHOSON Demands Removal of ROK Research Center

SK0504045094 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0444 GMT 5 Apr 94

[Text] Pyongyang, April 5 (KCNA)—The Kim Yong-sam group must ponder over the consequences to be entailed by its development of nuclear weapons stepped up behind the facade of a nuclear row against the fellow countrymen and remove its heavy water reactor and multi-purpose research reactor before it is too late, says a MINJU CHOSON analyst today.

The news analyst goes on:

The puppets' nuclear row is aimed at hurling abuses and slanders at the DPRK to create the impression that its reactors are being used to develop nuclear weapons. However, it is the pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) in Wolsong and the multi-purpose research reactor in Taedok, South Korea, not the graphite moderated reactor in the North, that are actually being used to develop nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.

The South Korean puppets has stockpiled spent nuclear fuel containing more than ten tons of plutonium obtained through the PHWR and the multi-purpose research reactor they put into operation for the purpose of development of nuclear weapons. It will increase to twenty-four tons by the year 2000.

Referring to the aim sought by the Kim Yong-sam group in raising a hue and cry over the fictitious "North's nuclear problem," the analyst says:

The puppets seek in this to create the impression that the North is developing nuclear weapons and thus mislead public opinion and find an excuse for keeping the U.S.

troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea. At the same time, they intend to use their nuclear row as a smoke-screen for covering up their own nuclear arms development, while pretending to have any concern for a solution of the nuclear issue.

If they are really interested in a solution of the nuclear issue, they must stop taking issue with the fellow countrymen in a far-fetched manner and demand the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea. And they must discontinue their nuclear row, immediately give up their own nuclear arms development and prove this through the elimination of the PHWR in Wolsong and the multi-purpose research reactor in Taedok.

#### **ROK Official Says Deadline for DPRK Inspections 'End of April'**

SK0404020494 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
4 Apr 94 p 2

[By Kim Cha-su from Tokyo]

[Text] A controversy has arisen over the deadline for further inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. A report to the UN Security Council by IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that further inspections of the North Korean nuclear facilities must be conducted within six weeks. Therefore, some people say that the deadline should be the end of April, and others say it should be mid-May.

An ROK Foreign Ministry official, who is now visiting Japan, said on 3 April that this issue must be clarified because the deadline for further inspections would be an important factor for the UN Security Council's next step.

The Security Council president's statement indirectly mentioned the deadline, saying: "The Council invites the director general of the IAEA to report further to the Security Council on the question of completion of the inspection activities agreed between the IAEA and the DPRK on 15 February 1994, when the director general is scheduled to report on the follow-up inspections required to maintain continuity of safeguards, as noted in the director general's report to the council."

However, when presenting a report to the Security Council on 24 March, Director General Blix said that to ensure the continuity of nuclear safeguards, further inspections of not only the facilities which were not inspected during the inspection period ending 15 February but the facilities which were inspected during the same period must be conducted within six weeks.

The Foreign Ministry official views that "within six weeks" must be interpreted to be six weeks from 15 February, when the first round of inspections were completed.

#### **ROK Vice Foreign Minister Suggests 'Phased Sanctions' on DPRK**

SK3003011494 Seoul YONHAP in English 0107 GMT  
30 Mar 94

[Text] Seoul, March 30 (YONHAP)—Vice Foreign Minister Hong Sun-yong suggested Tuesday the imposition of phased sanctions on North Korea to solve the nuclear problem, starting with a cutoff of all aid and even exchanges on peaceful use of atomic power.

"We have to press North Korea by stages in order to solve the nuclear problem," Hong told a conference of the ruling camp's chapter leaders.

"We will continue to show our efforts for a peaceful resolution in order to secure Chinese participation, but phased sanctions are inevitable after a statement by the UN Security Council president," he said.

The council initially planned on adopting a resolution demanding that Pyongyang allow inspection of its suspected facilities, but has backed away to a presidential statement in the face of Chinese opposition.

The statement is likely to be issued this week or next week.

Possible sanctions could start with a halt to technical assistance and exchanges on peaceful use of atomic energy, then move to a ban on all exchanges of strategic materials, a ban on money transfers or trade in raw materials, and finally to a full embargo, Hong said.

"The North Korean economy would be fatally wounded even if just 5 to 10 percent of its crude oil supply or money from Chochongnyon in Japan was embargoed," the vice foreign minister said.

Chochongnyon is an association of pro-North Korea residents operating in Japan.

North Korean-U.S. diplomatic normalization would take considerable time because it requires not only an international consensus but an understanding of bilateral issues including American POWs, missile export controls and human rights, said Hong.

On the results of President Kim Yong-sam's visit to China, Hong said he was under the impression that Beijing had emphasized its commitment to a peaceful solution rather than sanctions.

"It seems to indicate China is unwilling to provoke North Korea," he said.



## JAPAN

**Official Denies Japan's Nuclear Armament**

OW0704115494 Tokyo KYODO in English 1140 GMT  
7 Apr 94

[Text] Tokyo, April 7 KYODO—A senior Foreign Ministry official Thursday [7 April] denied suspicion by some countries that Japan may arm with nuclear weapons now that it has launched the new plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor "Monju," which produces more plutonium than it uses.

"Japan has properly accepted (international) nuclear inspections," said the official on the condition of anonymity. "Nuclear armament will not benefit Japan...I can understand some countries think Japan will arm with nuclear weapons if North Korea does so."

The official said Japan must clear the suspicion on such occasions as summit meetings and foreign ministerial meetings with every country.

Earlier the same day, North Korea accused Japan of promoting a plan to become a nuclear power, according to the official KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (KCNA).

"The commissioning of Monju fully reveals Japan's undisguised scheme to become a nuclear power by securing a large quantity of plutonium for itself and manufacturing nuclear weapons any moment," the KCNA said.

Monju reached criticality Tuesday morning in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, on the Sea of Japan coast. Criticality is the point at which the reaction in the reactor's fissionable material is sufficient to sustain a chain reaction.

Some environmentalists have criticized the operation of Monju partly because plutonium can be used to produce nuclear weapons.

**'Sources' Say Nuclear Reactor Project To Begin in May**

OW0204070294 Tokyo KYODO in English 0615 GMT  
2 Apr 94

[Text] Tokyo, April 2 KYODO—A long-delayed atomic reactor project by a government-financed power development company is expected to get under way in northern Japan in May, industry sources reported Saturday [2 April].

The sources said the Electric Power Development Co. aims to reach agreement with the local fisheries organization on terms of the project which has been pending for the past 11 years.

The company plans to build an experimental light-water type reactor, known as the Advanced Thermal Converter Reactor (ATR), to start operations in the year 2003.

The reactor can be remodeled to consume plutonium as fuel, they said.

The sources said the company has to clear a major obstacle before the project is launched—high construction costs inflated since the original plan was drawn up.

Construction costs, originally estimated at 396 billion yen, have inflated 20 to 30 percent in the past 11 years, making it inevitable for the company to review a cost sharing agreement reached with electric power companies, they said.

The company, a joint venture between the government and nine major electric power companies, is 66.6 percent owned by the government and 33.4 percent by power firms.

The original agreement reached between the two parties calls for the government and the power companies to shoulder one-third of the cost each, with the remainder contributed by the Electric Power Development Co.

The power companies, which have agreed to purchase electricity generated at the plant at 15 yen per kilowatt, said they will have to raise utility rates if the production cost rises above the agreed level.

They argue that the importance of the ATR as a facility to supply plutonium for fast breeder reactors has declined due to a worldwide glut of natural uranium, the sources said.

The Science and Technology Agency and the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. stressed the role to be played by the ATR as a system to consume plutonium.

The corporation has been experimenting on the use of plutonium with an ATR in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, since 1979.

**Fast Breeder Reactor 'Monju' Reaches Criticality**

OW0504041694 Tokyo KYODO in English 0344 GMT  
5 Apr 94

[Text] Tsuruga, Fukui Pref., April 5 KYODO—Japan's new plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor "Monju" reached criticality Tuesday morning [5 April] in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, on the Sea of Japan coast.

Criticality is the point at which the reaction in the reactor's fissionable material is sufficient to sustain a chain reaction.

It was attained at 10:01 A.M. when workers at the governmental Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. (Donen) in Monju pulled the last of 19 control rods to a point just short of its total removal from the reactor.

Gradual removal of the last rod, at the center of the reactor, began in four stages from shortly before 9 A.M., allowing the reactor to reach criticality with it 70 percent removed.

The goal was achieved eight years and six months after construction of the plant got under way in October 1985 and after three postponements.

Start-up of the 600 billion yen plant was delayed for a third time last October because of a technical malfunction in fuel production facilities last July.

The reactor is fueled by a mixture of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide.

Japan has made fast breeder reactors, which produce more fissionable material than they consume, a cornerstone of its nuclear power policy.

The power industry intends to have two fully operational fast breeder reactors built by 2003.

The Monju reactor has the capacity to produce 280,000 kilowatts of electricity.

The Monju core contains a total of 1.4 tons of reactor-grade plutonium and 4.5 tons of depleted uranium.

Monju represents the third stage in the government's plan to develop a fast breeder reactor, beginning with an earlier experimental reactor "Joyo" which reached criticality in 1977 in Oarai, Ibaraki Prefecture.

Scientists say Monju-style reactors use fuel 60 times more efficiently than conventional uranium reactors.

One of the features of Monju is its use of liquid sodium coolant which has a high heat conducting capacity.

The reactor is scheduled to go on line supplying electricity from April 1995 and become a commercially operating supplier by December the same year.

Several industrialized countries which were developing fast breeder reactors have shut down their projects, citing high costs and safety factors.

Some international critics say that since the Cold War is over, Japan should not rely on fast breeder reactors for energy self-sufficiency because they produce fuel that can be diverted to nuclear weapons.

Residents near the reactor are still fighting suits in the courts against Donen and the government urging a halt to the construction and running of the reactor.

But the power industry has welcomed the criticality of Monju as a step toward the commercialization of fast breeder reactors.

A meeting of the heads of nine of the nation's major power suppliers in January outlined plans for producing 6.6 million kilowatts of power from fast breeder reactors, the first of which would begin construction soon after 2000 in time for commercial operation by 2003.

A fully operational fast breeder reactor costs an estimated 400 billion yen, about 1.5 times the cost of a light water reactor.

At present, some 30 percent of Japan's electricity is generated by 42 nuclear reactors throughout the country.

Japan by 2010 will be annually using some 50 tons of plutonium mixed with uranium for light-water reactors and about 35 tons more for fast breeder reactors, according to the country's energy plan.

### **Seventeen Nuclear Plant Problems Reported in 1993**

*OW0604124194 Tokyo KYODO in English 1046 GMT 6 Apr 94*

[Text] Tokyo, April 6 KYODO—The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) said Wednesday [6 April] there were 17 reported cases of problems and accidents involving Japan's nuclear power plants in fiscal 1993, down three from the previous fiscal year.

On average, the number of problems and accidents per plant in operation stood at a low of 0.3 for the year. There were 46 nuclear power plants in operation in 1993.

The ministry's Agency of Natural Resources and Energy is required to report all serious incidents under the electricity enterprises act.

MITI also listed seven instances of less serious problems that are by law not required to be reported.

Breaking down serious accidents, agency officials said there were 10 cases in which reactors were shut down manually and seven instances in which damage was found during periodic reactor checks.

There were no reported automatic shutdowns, in which the emergency core cooling system shuts down the reactor, the most important safety mechanism to prevent nuclear accidents.

The officials also said operating rates for the nation's nuclear power plants averaged 75.4 percent in fiscal 1993 ended on March 31.

It was the 11th straight year the average operating rate topped the 70 percent mark.

## **NORTH KOREA**

### **Radio Charges U.S. With 'Aerial Espionage' During 21-30 March**

*SK3103015194 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1300 GMT 30 Mar 94*

[Text] The U.S. imperialists dared [kamhaeng] to conduct a series of aerial espionage on the northern half of the Republic. According to military sources, an RC-135 strategic reconnaissance plane, which flew to the sky

above South Korea from the U.S. imperialists' overseas base on 28 March, made a sortie to the sky above the areas near the Military Demarcation Line [MDL] and ran wild in taking aerial photographs and electronic reconnaissance on the strategic centers [chollyakchok chungsimjidaedul] of the northern half of the Republic while making repeated shuttle flights between east and west. The strategic reconnaissance plane has conducted aerial espionage more than 10 times since the beginning of March.

Meanwhile, from around 17:00 [08:00 GMT] to 24:00 [15:00 GMT] on 29 March, a U-2 high-altitude strategic reconnaissance plane made night flights in the skies above the areas adjacent to Oeyon Island, Yangpyong, and Yangyang and ran amok in aerial reconnaissance on the entire area of the northern half of the Republic.

On 9 and 15 March, three of the high-altitude strategic reconnaissance planes made 24-hour alternate flights around the sky above the areas near the MDL and were frenzied with aerial espionage.

Aerial espionage by the U.S. imperialists has been intensified concurrently with their full-scale military confrontation commotion [chonmyon kunsajok taekyol sodong] against us since 21 March, the date on which the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks had been scheduled.

On 24 March, the U.S. imperialists dared to conduct aerial espionage on the northern half of the Republic by deploying five RC-12's, four RV-1 Army tactical reconnaissance planes, two U-2 high-altitude strategic reconnaissance planes, and two EH-60 electronic-warfare helicopters day and night on the sky above South Korea. On 26 March, they also ran amok in aerial espionage on our side by flying seven RC-12 Army tactical reconnaissance planes on the sky above the areas near the MDL.

The frequency of such aerial espionage on the northern half of the Republic by the U.S. imperialists during the period from 21 to 30 March totalled over 90 times. The total frequency in March amounted to 234 times, 40 more than that of February.

Various facts clearly show how the U.S. imperialist are running wild with blood-shot eyes in the preparatory maneuvers for a war of aggression against the northern half of the Republic.

#### **Pyongyang Reportedly Builds Missile Sites Along Chinese Border**

*SK0804015994 Seoul YONHAP in English 0152 GMT 8 Apr 94*

[Text] Tokyo, April 8 (YONHAP)—North Korea is building missile launching sites along the Chinese border, the ASAHI SHIMBUN reported in a Seoul-dated story on Friday [8 April].

In an interview with the Japanese newspaper, former North Korean Army 1st Lt. Yim Yong-son, who defected to South Korea last September, said Pyongyang had

selected areas along the Chinese border as missile launching sites, judging that an attacker would avoid these areas for fear of hitting China by accident, the report said.

Saying he was quoting fellow soldiers at an Army engineering unit engaged in construction of missile bases where he worked before defecting to Seoul, Yim said that although North Korea's missile launching sites are located along the eastern coastlines of North Hamgyong and Kangwon Provinces and Wonsan city, the Stalinist North recently started building additional sites along the Chinese border.

Some 5,000 people are working at such sites at Chung-gangjin in Chagang Province and the job will be completed next year, the Japanese newspaper quoted Yim as saying.

"I heard that North Korea, presuming that the United States and South Korea would not attack missile sites along the Chinese border for fear of hitting China if war broke out, began constructing the sites along its Chinese border," he was quoted as saying.

#### **Envoy Says Pyongyang Will Not Allow Further IAEA Inspection**

*SK0104104294 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 1010 GMT 1 Apr 94*

[Text] Pak Kil-yon, North Korean ambassador to the United Nations, told reporters after the UN Security Council adopted the president's statement on North Korea that, since North Korea has fulfilled its duties under agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], it will not allow any kind of inspection by the IAEA from this point of time [ayon sijomeso oddon hyongtaeui IAEA sachalto hoyonghaji anul pangchimirago].

Ambassador Pak Kil-yon insisted that the adoption of the UN Security Council president's statement will not help to resolve the nuclear issue and he stressed the need to resume high-level talks between North Korea and the United States, saying that only North Korean-U.S. negotiations will help in resolving the nuclear issue.

Meanwhile, a spokesman for the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted negatively [pujongjogin panung] to the Russian proposal for holding eight-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue, expressing concerns about the possibility that it will complicate the issue.

#### **Ministry Spokesman 'Sternly' Denounces Patriots Shipment**

*SK2803111594 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1102 GMT 28 Mar 94*

["DPRK FM Spokesman Urges United States To Cancel Deployment of Patriot in S. Korea"—KCNA headline]



[Text] Pyongyang, March 28 (KCNA)—If the United States finally deploys new-type missiles, turning a deaf ear to our just demand for an immediate stop to the deployment of Patriot missiles in South Korea, it would entail grave consequences, said a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in a statement today, urging the United States to ponder over it.

The statement says:

Forty-eight Patriot missile launching pads and a more than 800-men missile unit are moving to South Korea from Texas, the United States, on order from the U.S. President on March 21, and they will reportedly arrive in South Korea toward the end of April. This proves that, from the very beginning, the United States had no intention to solve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula through dialogue and negotiations but has used the "nuclear problem" as a means of isolating and stifling the DPRK.

We sternly denounce the U.S. shipment of Patriot missiles to South Korea as a deliberate act to openly break the agreed point of the DPRK-USA joint statement on refraining from nuclear threat to the other and push the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of war.

The United States is bringing Patriot missiles to South Korea, laying the blame for the collapse of the dialogue at the door of the DPRK. This is a deliberate, dangerous military action to make the military situation of the Korean peninsula all the more unstable and, further, cause another war.

Though the U.S. authorities are now claiming that the Patriot is a "defensive weapon," they cannot justify its deployment in South Korea with any pretext.

From the topographical point of view, the Patriot missile can be used for the purpose of strike at any place of the Korean peninsula, which is not large. It is known to everyone that its target can be changed by the kind of the warhead it is tipped with. The U.S. shipment of new-type Patriots in South Korea is nothing but an open aggressive act to threaten the DPRK militarily and make a forestalling strike at it.

The United States reveals its intention to keep hold on South Korea indefinitely as its forward base in the Far East and continue to play the role of the MP [military police] in this region by deploying the improved missiles.

The decision of the United States to deploy the new-type Patriot missiles in South Korea is an illegal act of wantonly violating the Korean Armistice Agreement and ignoring the armistice machine.

The armistice agreement clearly stipulates that military equipment and combat materiel shall not be introduced into the Korean peninsula.

In the past days, the United States shipped into South Korea nuclear arms and many other kinds of equipment

of new types in a covert manner, fearful of the armistice agreement. This time, however, it openly declared the deployment of the new-type of Patriot missiles in South Korea and is forcing it in broad daylight. This shows that the U.S. authorities pay no heed to the armistice agreement and armistice machine, and they throw away any international commitments like a pair of worn-out shoes if it is to attain their aim.

It must not be overlooked that the South Korean authorities, wearing its own nuclear helmet under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella," officially asked for the deployment of the Patriot missiles, clinging to the coattails of outside forces as ever. This clearly shows that the South Korean authorities have joined the United States in the nuclear kickup to stifle the DPRK and that they are not interested at all in the implementation of the "joint declaration on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula."

The behaviour of the South Korean authorities makes it plain that they are more zealous in frustrating the DPRK-USA talks than in realising the exchange of special envoys.

The United States must immediately stop the deployment of the missiles posing a great threat to peace and security of the Korean peninsula and the Far East, and the South Korean authorities must discontinue at once their treacherous acts harming the fellow countrymen.

#### Spokesman Says Russian Proposal 'Might Complicate' Nuke Issue

SK0104051194 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0456 GMT 1 Apr 94

["DPRK FM Spokesman on Russia's Proposal for Multilateral Negotiations"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, April 1 (KCNA)—A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea gave the following answer to a question put by KCNA today about the recent proposal of Russia for multilateral negotiations for a solution to the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula:

The Russian Foreign Ministry in a recent statement proposed multilateral negotiations for dealing with the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

We affirmatively estimate the efforts of Russia to find a solution through political negotiations, opposing "sanctions" and pressure. But we fear that the Russian proposal for multilateral negotiations might complicate the matter.

As for the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, it is a political and military problem which should be settled between the DPRK and the United States first of all in view of its cause and its nature.

The U.S. authorities themselves had already admitted this and responded to DPRK-U.S. talks. The United States published a joint statement with the DPRK,

admitted the reasonableness of the DPRK's proposal for a package deal and agreed to immediate steps of simultaneous action.

But the solution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is undergoing twists and turns, without progress yet, because the United States, after reaching an agreement at the negotiating table with the DPRK, arbitrarily reversed the agreed points, setting unreasonable preconditions outside the conference room.

It wholly depends on the attitude of the United States how the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula would be settled in the future.

If Russia wants to contribute to the solution of the nuclear issue, it would be more suitable to the prevailing situation for it to exert its influence on the United States so that the latter may honestly implement the points of its agreement with the DPRK and observe the principle of impartiality, we think.

## SOUTH KOREA

### SKNDF White Paper Denounces Country's Nuclear Development

SK0204061294 (Clandestine) Voice of National Salvation in Korean to South Korea 0300 GMT 31 Mar 94

[Text] The Central Committee of the South Korean National Democratic Front [SKNDF] on 30 March published a white paper revealing that the heavy water reactor in Wolsong and the multipurpose research reactor in Taedok are for nuclear development.

Saying that the Kim Yong-sam clique misled the public opinion by insisting that the experimental reactors of North Korea are for the development of nuclear weapons, so as to kick up anti-North smear campaign, the white paper pointed out that this is like an act of a thief turning on the victim with a club.

The white paper maintained that the reactors used for the development of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula are not the experimental reactor of North Korea, which has generating capacity of 5,000 kilowatts, but the heavy water reactor in Wolsong with 678,700 kilowatt and the multipurpose research reactor in Taedok with 30,000 kilowatt.

Based on accurate materials, the white paper expressed that the Wolsong heavy water reactor is a reactor for the development of nuclear weapons disguised as one for commercial use. It added that it is a plutonium-producing reactor, introduced for the development of nuclear weapons and not for commercial use, in view of its purpose and structure. The white paper disclosed that the Wolsong heavy water reactor discharges a large amount of spent fuel containing high-level plutonium and is used directly for the development of nuclear weapons.

In addition, the white paper pointed out that the multipurpose research reactor complex is a reactor exclusively for nuclear arms development under the veil of research. The white paper exposed that the multipurpose research reactor is a reactor for the development of nuclear weapons set up in the eighties as an alternate project as the attempt to introduce it for the key role in the nuclear development in the seventies had failed.

The white paper revealed on the basis of the accurate materials that the multipurpose research reactor is not an experimental reactor with a peaceful purpose but for military use which is used as a diazole in the production of nuclear weapons, and said the problem lies on the fact it is closely linked with reprocessing facilities.

The white paper insists that all these facts prove that the Wolsong heavy water reactor and the multipurpose research reactor in Taedok are for the military use, and it is South Korea, not North Korea, which confronts the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The white paper said that the South Korean authorities are openly claiming the reexamination of the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and eager to develop the nuclear weapons by openly calling for nuclear option. If this is not true, the white paper maintains, the South Korean authorities must give up the policy of nuclear arms development pushed ahead in accordance with the anti-North nuclear smear campaign, and declare the removal of the heavy water reactor and the multipurpose research reactor which are used for the production of nuclear weapons.

### Editorial Urges Team Spirit Suspension, Patriot Deployment

SK3103065694 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 31 Mar 94 p 6

[Editorial: "Team Spirit' & Patriot Missiles"]

[Text] The joint U.S.-Korea military exercise Team Spirit is intended to maintain the defense capability of the Korean and American forces here against a possible North Korean attack. So, it was naturally expected that the two allies would conduct the annual military drill this year too.

However, Seoul and Washington canceled it as a concession in the nuclear negotiations between Pyongyang and South Korea, the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Now that the hardline Stalinist state has failed to carry out its half of the bargain, this concession might be expected to be withdrawn. But Pyongyang is again threatening to pull out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) if the U.S. and South Korea resume the exercise, which Pyongyang calls a rehearsal for a nuclear war against the North.

China has also come out in support of the North Korean position. Although President Kim Yong-sam stated after his summit with his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin in Beijing that the two did not discuss Team Spirit and the deployment of Patriot anti-missile batteries in the South, Chinese officials made it clear China is as opposed to them as before.

A formal Seoul decision on the two matters is expected after President Kim's return home, as he promised before his departure for Japan and China a week ago. With the two presidents having called for a negotiated settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem through dialogue among the parties concerned, Kim is likely to weigh the further postponement of the military drill in expectation of a change in Pyongyang's nuclear stance.

It is our view that suspension of the Team Spirit drill needs to be considered, lest it provide an excuse for the North to translate its NPT pullout threat into action, leaving no room for a peaceful solution to the issue. Since Seoul and Washington have used Team Spirit as a bargaining chip in nuclear negotiations in the past, they may well decide to leave it as a card up their sleeves for use in the future.

On the other hand, Korea and the U.S. need to positively consider the deployment of Patriot missiles, as it is designed for defense against the North's Scud missiles. It is illogical and unreasonable for Pyongyang to voice its opposition to the Patriot deployment in the South, while it produces and develops offensive missiles.

In a nutshell, the suspension of Team Spirit is recommendable for the present in order to avoid the worst but the Patriot missiles are needed as a war deterrent to cope with the erratic and unpredictable North.

Our side's unlimited concessions at this point could rather encourage the defiant North to continue adventurism and brinkmanship that are in no one's interests.

## **ROK 'Tentatively' Suspends Team Spirit Until Mid-May**

*SK0404013794 Seoul YONHAP in English 0130 GMT 4 Apr 94*

[Text] Seoul, April 4 (YONHAP)—The Seoul government has tentatively decided to suspend the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercise Team Spirit until mid-May, the deadline for North Korea to allow further inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), informed sources said Monday.

The United Nations Security Council told North Korea to permit IAEA checks by the middle of May in a presidential statement issued March 31.

The government will hold a meeting of related ministers this week, after Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu returns from trips to the United States and Japan, to discuss Team Spirit's suspension, the sources said. A final decision on suspending the war games will be made at a South Korean-U.S. defense ministers' meeting.

U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry will visit Seoul on April 17 to discuss the North Korean problem and meet with his South Korean counterpart Yi Pyong-tae.

The South Korean Government is considering suspension of Team Spirit because it wants the North to respond positively to the Security Council president's statement.

If Pyongyang refuses to allow inspections by mid-May, however, Seoul may resume Team Spirit in late May or sometime in the second half of this year, the sources said.

Seoul also plans to allow deployment of Patriot missiles as scheduled since the Patriot is purely a defensive weapon.



## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**Argentina To Support Exportation of Peruvian Radioisotopes**

PY3003010194 Lima Radio Programas del Peru  
Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Report by Enrique Vidal]

[Text] Argentine Ambassador Arturo Osorio has said that Argentina will support Peru's bid to export radioisotopes produced at the Huarangal nuclear plant. He said this after visiting the modern facilities located some 33 km north of Lima. In the company of Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute Director Conrado Seminario, Osorio made the following comments:

[Begin recording] Osorio: We have visited this nuclear plant and can appreciate its optimum level of efficiency, the high level of professional training, and their excellent skill in handling this delicate nuclear plant, which also represents a security issue for the world. It conforms to the strictest nuclear safety regulations and it is really marvelous. It is a great satisfaction for those of us who have worked together to build this nuclear power plant as it will enable us to continue our partnership—from a commercial standpoint or through the reciprocal transfer of technology by means of this great work, which is perhaps the most important nuclear reactor in Latin America.

Unidentified reporter: Are you hinting at the possibility of entering into partnership to export?

Osorio: Yes, there that possibility.

Reporter: How could this be turned into something concrete, Mr. Ambassador?

Osorio: That is a subject for experts to address. I believe that once the authorities of both countries discuss things at technical level, we will perhaps have—in the near future—a positive [words indistinct]. [end recording]

That was Argentine Ambassador to Lima Arturo Osorio, after making a technical inspection of the Huarangal nuclear power plant and its 10-megawatt reactor accompanied by Conrado Seminario. The building of this plant, which will also produce radioisotopes used in medicine and in industry, has been possible thanks to the technical cooperation of Argentine experts. We should point out that 35 percent of the electrical energy consumed in Argentina is produced by nuclear power plants.

## ARGENTINA

**Atomic Energy Commission To Build Sewage Irradiation Plant**

PY0604011594 San Miguel de Tucuman LA GACETA  
in Spanish 20 Mar 94 p 16

[Text] DIPOS [expansion unknown] trustee Benjamin Garcia Posse has signed an agreement with the National

Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA) for the construction of a Sewage Waste Irradiation Plant (PIBA) [Planta de Irradiacion de Barros Cloacales]. The project will seek to solve the city's waste recycling problem, guaranteeing its rational, safe, economic, and harmless return to the environment.

CNEA will provide the funds, engineering, direction, construction, and installation for the plants, as well as the radioactive material (Cobalt 60) and the training of the personnel who will operate the plant. The plant's construction will be made to coincide with the construction of the Sewage Disposal Plant in San Felipe.

The contract was signed by Roberto Oscar Marques, CNEA radioisotopes and radiation area manager, on behalf of the atomic agency. Engineer Jorge Guillermo Graino also attended. During the ceremony at DIPOS, CNEA experts and officials exchanged ideas on the project.

The contract establishes that CNEA will intervene and supervise the installation's security as well as any operation involving the movement of radioactive materials inside and outside of the plant.

Operation periods will not exceed 10 years. In the 11th year the ownership of PIBA will be transferred to DIPOS.

The treatment consists of forcing the "sludge" around a cobalt-60 radioactive source carrier installed in an irradiator, which is a bunker built eight meters underground with concrete walls 1.4 meters thick acting as armor against radiation.

Once the sludge is pasteurized it will go into a tank for bacteriological and radiation control. Here routine controls will check whether the sludge is harmless.

## BRAZIL

**'Resumption' of Nuclear Plant Construction Reported**

PY2803131894 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO  
PAULO in Portuguese 25 Mar 94 p A16

[Article by Tania Malheiros]

[Text] Rio de Janeiro—Angra-2's construction will be resumed in the next 30 days and be financed with the \$750 million loan the Brazilian Government obtained from German banks. The decision was made by the Ministries of Finance, Planning, and Mines and Energy, which approved the Furnas Electric Power Plants, Inc. report on the need to finish the construction work. Furnas President Marcelo Siqueira on 24 March confirmed the news to this newspaper.

The construction cost is calculated at \$1.5 billion. The Brazilian Electric Power Company, Inc. and Furnas will

have to contribute the rest of the money. "This resumption is not inflationary; we will not receive any money from the Treasury," Siqueira said.

According to him, Furnas will begin to publish the public bid documents for completion of Angra-2's construction in the next 15 days. He said the plant's civil work is practically finished and only the equipment still has to be assembled. This equipment—most of it purchased from Germany and some of it manufactured in Brazil—has been stored in warehouses at the Angra nuclear complex.

Ayrton Caiuby, director of the CNEN [National Nuclear Energy Commission], said that in the next few days, CNEN members will meet to decide the date when Angra-1 will be put into operation.

#### **Auditing Study Triples Estimated Cost of Nuclear Plant**

*PY0504225994 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 3 Apr 94 p A23*

[By Marcelo Faga]

[Text] An auditing study that the National Accounting Office (TCU) made of Furnas Electric Power Plants, Inc. has detected differences, amounting to billions of dollars, between the figures reported by Furnas and the real cost of construction of Brazilian nuclear power plants, especially Angra-2. The report, which raises objections to the figures released by Furnas, remained shelved for months within the TCU. Its conclusions could destroy the executive branch's reasons for justifying the decision to continue with the construction of the plant.

The auditing study reveals, for example, that Angra-2 has so far cost \$5 billion, according to the most reliable calculations. This figure is more than three times the amount that Furnas has officially declared to have spent since 1977—\$1.7 billion.

The TCU report also concluded that the estimates of the investment that is necessary for concluding the project are not reliable. It is expected that the plant will call for investments that are higher than the cost of a hydroelectric plant with the same generation capacity of 1,300 megawatts.

Based on the results of the auditing study, the Greenpeace environmentalist organization will request suspension of construction of the plant. "Angra-2 accounts have been revealed for the first time," says Greenpeace

leader Rui de Goes. He remarked that the auditing confirms the theses of nongovernmental organizations which are against the nuclear program.

The TCU document has not only challenged the credibility of Furnas, but has also cast doubts over the accounts of the entire electric power sector. It says that in the face of the estimated cost, "nuclear energy is not competitive in Plan 2015" which was prepared by Eletrobras [Brazilian Electric Power Company Inc.]. "With the most pessimistic hypothesis, thermal power will not be competitive with hydroelectric power until 2005," the TCU report says, noting that the nuclear option is the most expensive thermal power generation alternative.

"For FURNAS, building a hydroelectric power plant or a nuclear power plant makes no difference, because the Union subsidizes the cost of nuclear energy," the TCU report says. Based on this report, the \$5 billion that has already been spent, plus the \$2.3 billion that is necessary for completion of the project, amounts to \$7.3 billion for the total cost of Angra-2.

The limit for Furnas spending on the construction of Angra-2 corresponds to the amount that would be spent on a hydroelectric power plant of the same size—of approximately 1,300 megawatts. This would mean an investment of \$1.2 billion for Furnas. The Treasury must supply the remaining \$6.1 billion, which amounts to two minimum salaries for each Brazilian family.

These figures, however, could be even larger. The TCU auditing did not estimate the financial expenses included in the construction of the plant. In the case of Angra, they account for 40 percent of the cost. For its part, Eletrobras has other estimates of the cost for completion of the project. It estimates that \$2 billion is necessary for completion of the project.

The TCU auditing study also has doubts about those estimates. "Angra-2 cost estimates should be considered cautiously." The report recalls the case of Angra-1, "whose cost was estimated at \$319 million, but which turned out to be several times higher."

The conclusions of the TCU concerning Angra-1 accounts are equally devastating. The auditors estimated the cost at \$3.9 billion, noting that this figure "affords a new base for calculation of the cost-benefit ratio for Angra-1," adding that this project "has obviously contradicted the terms of the economy-efficacy-efficiency trinomial." Angra-1 has been disconnected for one year, after a radioactive leak in the cooling system caused by a deficiency in the nuclear fuel rods.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**Arab League Calls for Pressure on Israel To Join NPT**

NC2703161394 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1400 GMT  
27 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Cairo, 27 Mar (MENA)—Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' has declared that the Arab League Council adopted a resolution calling on the international community to put pressure on Israel to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and place its nuclear weapons under international inspection. This, he added, falls within the context of the Arab states' demand to free the Middle East of nuclear weapons.

In a news conference he held this afternoon at the Arab League headquarters, al-Shar' said that the Arab League Council had agreed on a unified Arab position when the time comes to renew the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, so that Israel may not be excluded from signing this treaty. He noted that weapons of mass destruction are dangerous to pan-Arab security and, therefore, it is natural for the Arabs to defend their interests.

On the Arab position toward France following its recent agreement on military and security cooperation with Israel, al-Shar' said: We were surprised by the noticeable consolidation of French-Israeli ties recently and following the Israeli massacre at the al-Ibrahimi Mosque. It came at a time when we are discussing the peace process and despite the fact that Israel possesses a large arsenal of all types of weapons and is occupying Arab lands, he added. Al-Shar' emphasized that the matter had been brought up during the meetings of the Arab League Council, which unanimously denounced this step as one that does not serve the peace process in the region and harms Arab-French ties, which were marked by friendship and balance. [passage omitted]

**Aden Accuses Sanaa of Importing Chemical Weapons**

JN3003062394 Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic  
0600 GMT 30 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Military sources close to Yemeni Defense Minister Haytham Qasim have said in Aden that the North Yemenis have imported various types of chemical weapons and ammunition from East European states through a Jewish arms dealer known for his close ties with Zionist circles that are very active in these states.

Defense Ministry sources in Sanaa categorically denied this. They said such claims tarnish the image of Yemen and obstruct the implementation of the pledge and accord document signed in Amman to achieve Yemeni reconciliation. Defense Ministry sources in Sanaa said an officer, called Colonel 'Ali al-Hadi, a member of the South Yemeni Socialist Party and armament director at the Defense Ministry, is currently in an East European

state to make a deal to purchase long-range missiles against the will of the Defense Ministry in Sanaa. [passage omitted]

**More on Allegations of Chemical Weapons Imports**

PM3003095894 London AL-HAYAH in Arabic  
30 Mar 94 pp 1, 4

[Faysal Makram and Iqbal 'Ali 'Abdallah report: "Aden: Sanaa Importing Chemical Weapons"]

[Excerpt] Sanaa, Aden—A statement issued by the Defense Ministry in Aden accuses "the economic military establishment in the capital, Sanaa, of importing various types of internationally banned chemical weapons and ammunition from a number of East European countries."

The statement, a copy of which AL-HAYAH received in Aden yesterday, says: "These weapons and ammunition are imported through a Jewish dealer who has strong links and ties with the Zionist centers of influence formed recently in a number of East European states."

The statement, which falls within the framework of the resumption of media campaigns between the southern forces supporting the Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP] and the northern forces supporting the General People's Congress, describes "the weapons brought to Yemen recently as weapons of mass destruction like those which have been and are still being destroyed in Iraq and which are banned in other states."

The statement says: "The military-economic establishment is a close commercial establishment controlled directly by the ruling military family in Sanaa. It controls most trade activities in the republic without the knowledge of the government and the House of Representatives."

The YSP, which controls Aden, and the Yemeni Reform Grouping [YRG], which is led by Shaykh 'Abdallah Bin-Husayn al-Ahmar, speaker of the House of Representatives, traded accusations yesterdays. The YRG said that houses belonging to its supporters in Aden has been stormed, while security sources in the city said that large quantities of weapons had been confiscated in hideouts in the city.

The sources added that "the security services in Aden have over the past two days discovered large quantities of weapons which were smuggled in secretly and delivered to terrorist elements belonging to the Jihad organization in Yemen." The sources said that "interrogations of the suspects accused of acquiring the weapons have shown that they belong to a major Islamic party in the country"—a clear reference to the YRG. [passage omitted]



**Indian 'News Analyses' Claim F-16's to Pakistan To Trigger Arms Race**

BK0304141094 Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES  
in Hindi 26 Mar 94 p 1

["News Analyses" by Ranjit Kumar]

[Text] The supply of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan will bring about a qualitative change in the strength of the Pakistan Air Force. The Pakistan Air Force presently has 37 F-16's and it is said that a similar number of additional F-16's will be supplied to Pakistan. Pakistan is demanding 71 such aircraft for which it has paid \$660 million in advance; it is highly possible that the United States will fulfill this demand by first supplying 38 F-16's and then another batch of 31 at a later stage.

This decision by the United States will provide a great setback to its nuclear nonproliferation targets. India could decide to massively deploy Prithvi and Agni missiles in response to the new consignment of F-16's to Pakistan. India only has started deploying Prithvi surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 250 km and out of respect for international concerns, no decision has been made about the deployment of Agni surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 2,500 km. The plan was to test three types of Agni missile and only a political decision regarding their deployment needs to be made after successful tests. Now that Pakistan is acquiring F-16's, which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons, India will be forced to give up its hesitations regarding the deployment of long-range missiles. In response, Pakistan too will deploy M-11 missiles in much greater number with the help of China. A single step by the United States will start an unprecedented arms race in South Asia, which it will not be able to stop. In the end, this arms race could prove fatal for the United States' own interests.

The statements issued recently by various level officials of the U.S. Administration's Departments of State and Defense make it clear that the United States is prepared to supply F-16's to Pakistan. Robin Raphel, U.S. assistant secretary of state for South Asia, during her current Indian visit is full of flattery while talking about relations with India, but she has not given any assurance on retracting the U.S. step of supplying F-16's to Pakistan which has adversely affected the Indian security environment. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's comments to the U.S. Senate on 24 March makes it clear that the United States wants to give F-16's to Pakistan. Talbott, when he visits India on 6 April, will add insult to injury by asking India to cap its nuclear program because he is seeking a similar assurance from Pakistan.

The logic for giving F-16's to Pakistan at this time is that the United States will ask Pakistan to accept conditions in return for the F-16's. These conditions will lead to a freeze of its nuclear program at the present level, or in the American terminology, to cap its nuclear program.

The capping of Pakistan's nuclear program will mean that it can maintain its current nuclear capability, but it cannot further enhance it.

At the beginning of the last decade the United States gave F-16's to Pakistan on the pretext of saving it from Soviet attacks from Afghanistan. Following India's protests, the United States argued that Pakistan is being supplied such conventional arms to make it feel secure and it then refrains from making nuclear weapons. It is interesting that Pakistan then not only acquired F-16's but continued its nuclear program as well. What guarantee is there now that Pakistan will cap its nuclear program forever in accordance with the pledge that it will make to the United States?

## INDIA

### Long-Range Akash Missile Tested, Future Use Told

#### Significance Told

94WP0070A Madras THE HINDU in English 5 Feb 94 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 4—India's missile programme crossed yet another milestone with the successful flight test on Thursday of the long-range surface-to-air missile, Akash. The missile, which has an ability to strike at a 25 km range can also engage several targets simultaneously. An indigenously produced radar (a phased array radar) on the weapon can track several targets together.

The Akash test follows successful flight manoeuvres carried out late last month of the anti-tank missile, Nag. In the wake of the induction of Prithvi surface-to-surface missile (range of 150 to 250 km) and the likelihood of a third test of the Agni IRBM, these successes bring India closer to acquiring its own arsenal of sophisticated missiles.

The development of the Akash is expected to give India an edge especially over Pakistan, which is not in the race for a weapon in this category.

Significantly, Thursday's test validated the ramjet propulsion technology, thus making India the third country which has achieved this capability. The ramjet principle utilises atmospheric air to obtain enormous energy from a low volume and weight. Consequently, this makes the missile lighter and extends the range.

#### To Replace Russian Missiles

94WP0070B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 15 Feb 94 p 15

[Text] New Delhi, February 14—The Indian Air Force (IAF) is expected to induct Akash, the multi-target surface-to-air, missile (SAM), before year end. About 75 Akash missiles are expected to be inducted in the initial phase.

The Akash is to replace the Russian Pechora SAMs which comprise the bulk of the IAF's air defence missile system. The IAF has about 35 squadrons of the Pechora or SAM-III squadrons. The Pechoras first inducted into IAF in 1974, would be ready for a phase out in another ten years.

The indigenously developed Akash is meant to replace the Pechora missiles. While the Pechora has a kill range of 18 km, the Akash has an enhanced range of about 25 km. Apart from other aspects of technological superiority, the development of Akash saves foreign exchange.

The defence research and development organisation (DRDO), the developing agency, successfully test-fired the Akash on February 3. Significantly, the Akash is to be integrated with the multi-target handling Rajendra phased array radar system which will enhance the IAF's air defence capability.

The Akash will have a wider attack cone thereby enabling it to neutralise more than one aircraft at a time. The concept involves exploding the missile's warhead close to the targeted aircraft and hitting it with shrapnels which spread in a conical form.

The Akash and the Rajendra radar combine to provide a state-of-the-art air defence system to the IAF. Though the Akash has been tested on an earlier occasion, the February 3 test marked a breakthrough in the technology of "integrated two-stage rocket-ramjet." While a normal rocket has an inbuilt oxygen (oxidiser) supply, the ramjet rocket draws air during flight for combustion in conjunction with a fuel rich propellant. The integrated rocket (booster)-ramjet (sustainer) technology has weight and range advantages over conventional missile systems.

#### Expert Discusses Launch Vehicle Program

94WP0071E Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA  
in English 5 Feb 94 p 5

[Text] Bombay, February 4—The next launch of the polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) is tentatively scheduled for September or October, according to Dr S. Srinivasan, programme director of the integrated launch vehicle programme of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).

Speaking to this paper here today, Dr Srinivasan, an aeronautical engineer who has masterminded ISRO's launch vehicle programmes, said that the failure of last PSLV launch was due to an error in the software.

Earlier, speaking at the annual symposium on "Space Research in India: Achievements," organised by the Bombay Association of Science Education (BASE), Dr Srinivasan said the space age had come to stay in India and the objectives of India's space programme would go a long way in meeting the needs of society.

He said that, in the development of satellite launch vehicles, ISRO had gone step by step. "It has to be

developed in a cost effective manner," he told teachers who had come from different parts of Maharashtra.

Some of India's top aerospace scientists like Dr George Joseph, director, space applications centre, Ahmedabad, and Dr Ramachandran, deputy director of ISRO's Satellite Centre, are attending the three-day symposium at the Nehru Science Centre.

Dr Srinivasan said the development of a launch vehicle involved numerous disciplines like aeronautics and mechanical engineering. He said there would be one more launch of the augmented satellite launch vehicle (ASLV) later this year and work had begun on the geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV).

Emphasising the need of the ASLV programme, he said, it enabled space scientists to test various systems. "We need cryogenic engines and we will have it," said Dr George Joseph, while inaugurating the symposium.

Emphasising the importance of self-reliance in the field of launch vehicles, he said, the failure of the PSLV would help one to improve and correct mistakes.

He said that, 30 years ago, when India launched its space programme people doubted its wisdom. But, when they watch TV programmes they realise its benefits, he said.

Dr George Joseph later spoke to the audience about remote sensing programmes and its advantages.

In his presidential remarks, the director of the Homi Bhabha Centre for Science Education, Mr V.G. Kulkarni, said that Indian teachers were as good as those in foreign countries.

The director of the Nehru Science Centre, Dr R.M. Chakraborty, welcomed the gathering and the secretary of BASE, Mr P.K.G. Nair, proposed a vote of thanks.

#### Commentary Defends Fast-Breeder Nuclear Technology

BK0604040494 Delhi All India Radio Network  
in English 0245 GMT 6 Apr 94

[Commentary by K.S. Jayraman]

[Text] The reports that Japan's fast-breeder reactor is expected to go critical should be good news to India's nuclear scientists. India and Japan appear to be the only two countries pursuing the breeder technology in today's world that has become hostile to this new source of electric power. The hostility stems from two reasons.

One is the safety consideration, because of the complex technology involved in breeder reactors. It is for this reason that France, which pioneered the breeder technology, decided to shut down its 1,200-megawatt fast-breeder reactor.

To appreciate the second reason, one must know what a breeder is. The fast-breeder reactor has a core made of

plutonium fuel surrounded by a blanket of natural uranium. During the chain reaction, more plutonium is created in the blanket than what is consumed in the core, and hence the name breeder. One simply has to remove the blanket, extract the plutonium, and build another breeder with it or use the plutonium to build a bomb.

It is this possibility of nuclear proliferation that is at the heart of the American campaign against plutonium. In the United States spent nuclear fuel is not reprocessed to recover plutonium, and Washington does not want any other nation to produce plutonium, even for power generation, because of its fear that it can be diverted for bombs.

Interest in fast-breeders declined for yet another reason. In the 1970's it was anticipated that a spread of conventional reactors would lead to a shortage of uranium and make plutonium the fuel of choice. But this did not happen. Japan relies almost totally on the outside world for energy. It sees fast-breeder technology is a promising route to reduce this dependence. Japan's prototype fast-breeder reactor Monju will produce 280 megawatts when it begins full operation next year.

India's compulsion to go into fast-breeder technology is dictated by the fact that while its uranium resources are limited, it has large deposits of thorium, which can be turned into a nuclear fuel. In order to efficiently make this conversion, India has to build fast-breeder reactors with cores made of plutonium and blankets out of thorium. India's fast-breeder test reactor at Kalpakkam, near Madras is about 10 years old, but its power level is nowhere near the designed 40 megawatt. It has succeeded in convincing Indian scientists that the technology is difficult to master but not impossible to learn.

India no doubt is way behind Japan in harnessing this power source, but its consolation is that it is not alone in pursuing this technology. Whether India will be able to commit enough resources to pursue its goal like Japan is, however, a big question mark.

#### **Nuclear Fuel Complex Celebrates Achievement**

*94WP0071B Hyderabad DECCAN CHRONICLE  
in English 13 Feb 94 pp 1, 10*

[Text] Hyderabad, Feb. 12—Nagarjunasagar in Nalgonda district has been formally selected for the location of the proposed nuclear power plant.

Mr S.K. Chatterjee, Managing Director, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), who is also the Chairman of the site selection committee, said here on Saturday that he would recommend to the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) for locating the nuclear plant at Nagarjunasagar.

Speaking at a function organised by the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) in connection with the production of 1,00,000th [as printed] fuel bundle used for pressurised heavy water type reactors, he said Nagarjunasagar was

the most suitable site in the country for the establishment of the multi-crore project to be taken up during the Ninth Five-Year Plan.

He said that a part of the project cost of Rs2,000 crore would have to be shared jointly by Andhra Pradesh Government and the NPCIL. Raising of funds for the project was an uphill task and all efforts would be made in this regard. The cost per MW would be Rs 4 crore for the project, which would have 2 x 500 MW stations. The Andhra Pradesh Government gave a positive response for establishing the plant in the State, he added. He, however, hastened to add that there was still a long process for the finalisation of the project, which among other things required environmental clearance. The NPCIL was in touch with the Andhra Pradesh Government and the State Electricity Board, he said.

Stating that the programmes of the NPCIL had slowed down due to paucity of funds, he said the NPCIL is now concentrating on joint ventures with the States. In this regard, the NPCIL would have a joint venture with Karnataka for establishing two projects at Kaigah and Mysore.

Dr R. Chidambaram, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), who inaugurated the NFC's productivity week celebrations, lauded the organisation's achievements in the nuclear fuel cycle and its dominant role in the country's peaceful nuclear programmes.

He asked the NFC to make all efforts to bring down the cost of production and to adopt innovative methods to help produce cost-effective material. "We have to improve the technology. We will not be able to get nuclear technology from outside. There is no dearth of talent, capability and commitment. But what we lack is the speed. We now have to do things faster to keep pace with the developed nations."

The NFC Chief Executive, Mr K.K. Sinha, who welcomed, said the NFC had crossed yet other milestones in its cherished goal of excellence by producing the 1,00,000th fuel bundle.

Stressing the need for accelerating the production, he said there was a general feeling that the output from public sector units was not commensurate with the investment on it and the fruits were not reaching the people.

Dr N. Kondalarao and Mr K. Balaramamoorthy, former chief executives of the NFC, said that the organisation grew from strength to strength over the years and carved a niche for itself in the area of excellence.

Dr Ravi Mallu, MP and president of the NFC Employees' Association, urged the AEC chairman, Dr R. Chidambaram to consider the demands of the employees which included risk allowance, insurance coverage and nutritious food to those working in the uranium unit and washing allowance to workers.



Later Dr R. Chidambaram handed over the 1,00,000th fuel bundle to Mr S.K. Chatterjee.

#### **Plant To Extract Uranium Proposed for Kerala**

94WP0091C Bombay *THE SUNDAY TIMES OF INDIA* in English 13 Feb 94 p 23

[Text] Bombay, February 12—A plant for recovery of uranium from phosphoric acid is proposed at Alwaye, Kerala, where a pilot plant set up by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre is in operation for about three years.

The technology used is developed by BARC [Bhabha Atomic Research Center], which will be joining hands with a few fertiliser companies in putting up the plant. The project report is under consideration.

The pilot plant is in the campus of FACT (Fertilisers and Chemicals Travancore Limited), which is one of the companies interested in the new project. SPIC [expansion not given] and Paradip Phosphates are said to be the others. The proposed plant will be put up adjacent to the factory.

India is one of five countries to have the technology for extracting uranium from phosphoric acid produced by fertiliser companies. The rock phosphates used by the companies contain some amount of uranium which has to be recovered to make the acid as also the effluents radiation-free.

There is also interest abroad in the BARC technology. For instance, the chairman of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission, during his visit to the city last month, evinced a keen interest in getting the technology. The proposal is being examined.

A special reference to the technology was made by Mr A.N. Prasad, director of BARC, at the inaugural function yesterday of the three-day national symposium on "organic reagents—synthesis and use in extractive metallurgy," organised by the Board of Research in Nuclear Science (BRNS).

While Prof M.M. Sharma, director of the University Department of Chemical Technology, dealt with the important role played by solvent extraction in the field of extraction metallurgy, Mr Prasad highlighted applications of solvent extraction techniques for nuclear and common metals and materials production and processing.

Prof Sharma stressed the need to take into account techno-economic aspects while developing production processes for various organic reagents.

Dr C.K. Gupta, director, materials group, BARC, recalled the pioneering work by the Uranium & Rare Earth Extraction Division in the field of solvent extraction and synthesis of organic reagents used in the process and said technology for production of some organic solvents was ripe for passing on to industry.

#### **Disarmament Talks Held With Canada**

94WP0071D Madras *THE HINDU* in English 4 Feb 94 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 3—India and Canada today discussed means of taking forward the disarmament agenda in the framework of the United Nations, which essentially rests on the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), cutting off production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and explosive devices, and establishing a satisfactory verification regime in this context.

Canada's Disarmament Envoy, Ms. Peggy Mason, who is slated to chair the U.N. Secretary General's Expert Group on Verification, arrived here via Kathmandu to discuss the leading questions of disarmament with India at the official level.

She is understood to have sought India's active cooperation in the UN Conference on Disarmament. India's initiative in this sphere is widely recognised, and dates back to 1982. The Action Plan enunciated by the late Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 had also called for an international verification regime under U.N. auspices.

#### **Paper Objects to U.S. Initiative on Nonproliferation**

BK0104151494 Delhi *INDIAN EXPRESS* in English 26 Mar 94 p 8

[Editorial: "Capping It All"]

[Text] The new American move to promote nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia is yet another illustration of the Clinton administration's tendency to come out with glib answers to admittedly complicated issues. The proposal aims at getting India and Pakistan to agree to cap their nuclear programmes and accept international inspection of their nuclear production facilities. There is hardly anything new about this approach. It had prompted earlier unsuccessful initiatives to bring about bilateral or regional accords on nuclear-free zones. The present attempt is essentially to present the same idea in a more attractive package. New Delhi must be extremely wary of the underlying trap. The renewed move is suspect especially because it looks like a clumsy stratagem to overcome strong Congressional opposition to the administration's frantic bid to scuttle the Pressler Amendment and supply F-16 combat aircraft to Pakistan. Originally, the administration had sought to oblige the Pakistani military establishment in return for the latter's agreement to verified capping of that country's nuclear programme. Since the proposal made no headway, Washington has now come up with the idea of roping in India into this dubious exercise. This suggests not so much an eagerness to promote nuclear non-proliferation as an overriding need to fulfill Pakistan's ambition to get hold of the sophisticated aircraft as soon as possible. It is particularly significant that while a

specific incentive has been offered to Pakistan for accepting the capping idea, no sign is yet discernible of a quid pro quo to India, too.

The more intriguing aspect relates to the facile talk of verifiable capping of nuclear installations. It is by now common knowledge that the existing mechanism of verifying these has proved to be anything but foolproof. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] was totally in the dark about Iraq's nuclear programme although it was a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. The same fatal deficiency has now been indicated in the case of North Korea which, too, has formally subscribed to NPT.

India has often underscored the vital importance of an unquestionably sound verification regime if the objective of non-proliferation is to be achieved. But the IAEA has not yet devised one. So long as this is the stark reality, New Delhi must not allow itself to be cajoled much less coerced into accepting any non-proliferation proposal. In fact, credible verification of full compliance with nuclear obligations should be high on the agenda of the NPT review conference next year. The Clinton administration's bid to jump the gun is thus entirely misconceived. Most pertinently, India is already a co-sponsor with the US of a UN resolution seeking an international convention for fissile material cut-off. This is all the more reason why the US initiative limited to South Asia lacks justification

## IRAN

### Nuclear Cooperation With PRC Discussed

NC0704112794 Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian

[First of two-part commentary by M.M. Ghaffari: "PRC-Iran: Strategic Cooperation in the Future"]

[15 Mar 94 p 4]

[Excerpts] Qian Qichen, deputy prime minister of the PRC, who is also the foreign minister, made a regional trip and visited Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. His trip to Iran was the most significant of all and it elicited much attention from political circles. Within the context of the PRC foreign minister's visit to Iran, we can look at the long-standing relations between the two countries and the trend toward broadening political and economic relations, as the PRC Government has always had friendly relations with Iran, even in the distant past. [passage omitted]

Even though in recent years, cooperation between the PRC and Iran has increased remarkably, it appears that there is greater scope for joint economic cooperation. There is evidence of the two countries' eagerness to expand these relations and the PRC has focused its attention on the Islamic Republic of Iran because it is a

large and important country in the Persian Gulf, south-west Asia and the Middle East, which can play an important role in regional developments as a political balance.

Reciprocally, as regards its foreign policy calculations, Iran considers the PRC a major country that is undergoing the greatest economic prosperity of the century and one that enjoys immense scope for maneuvering in the political arena of today.

The turmoil in the world prior to the Cold War and the elimination of tensions generated by the end to the Cold War; the U.S. domination in the world by a minority [as published]; and the new world order as propounded by the United States are the various phenomena that have heightened the sensitivity of Iran and the PRC so that the two countries have attained unanimity through greater historical understanding and political acumen with regard to the political developments in the region. [passage omitted]

As regards the use of nuclear energy in Iran, the United States has fomented tension in the region, implying that the PRC has initiated measures to transfer technology to Iran which is not for economic advantages but for military and political objectives. However, regardless of the tumultuous uproar in the world spearheaded by the United States regarding Iran's program of peaceful and amicable utilization of nuclear energy, the PRC continues its cooperation with Iran. What has been termed PRC-Iranian nuclear cooperation has generated much concern on the part of the Pentagon.

The U.S. apprehension can be viewed in the context of two perceptions: first, remarks by Iranian officials have raised questions about Iran's commitment to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and second, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf are regions in which the use of nuclear weapons would be extremely destabilizing. However, the United States, with its usual erroneous appraisals in foreign policy and for reasons of security and intelligence, is not inclined to elaborate on the nuclear issue in relation to Iran, Pakistan, DPRK, and India.

Perhaps, according to the perceptions of the Pentagon echelons, the presence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East can be a useful lever and a pretext to exert pressure on these countries at sensitive junctures. However, the vigilant nations that have thrown off the shackles of colonialism and exploitation are well aware that the usurper Jerusalem regime is the sole nuclear power in the Middle East and it even opposes inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. No Western or American government has ever protested against this regime. However, the United States audaciously declares that Iran's acquisition of nuclear capability may not be imminent but the United States has its own assessment upon which it is not willing to elaborate.

It also has no reason to believe that there is no cooperation between Iran and the PRC as regards a military-nuclear program.

Simultaneously, the U.S. mass media launched a coordinated propaganda program with similar reports that Iran is seeking to gain a nuclear capability and has the benefit of the PRC's cooperation and collaboration! The United States has constantly used the lever of pressure on various countries so that it can impede their paths of broadening cooperation with Iran. The PRC, which wishes to have deep and principled relations with Iran and in numerous cases pursues an independent policy on the international scene, has constantly been the target of U.S. blackmail. The United States has admitted to exerting pressure on various countries to prevent their cooperation with Iran in the field of nuclear technology and this is only the tip of the iceberg.

[16 Mar 94 p 4]

After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States directed most of its efforts toward destroying relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries and isolating Iran in the international arena. This can be considered an unchangeable characteristic of U.S. policies.

Political circles have described Iran's gaining nuclear capability as an extremely destabilizing factor in the Middle East, adding that the report of nuclear cooperation between Iran and the PRC is being disseminated just when those who participated in the Madrid peace conference have been sentenced to death! [as published] In the same vein, a U.S. nuclear expert stated that Iran and Pakistan have crossed the line toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons and Iraq has done a lot of research in the nuclear field. Had it not been for the Persian Gulf war, Iraq would have succeeded in manufacturing a nuclear bomb.

U.S. intelligence officials have apparently reached the conclusion that Iran is seriously and actively seeking to produce nuclear weapons and the PRC is assisting it in this regard. In conjunction with this clamor, THE NEW YORK TIMES commented under the title of "Hot Oil" saying: Most of the leaders of the Islamic Revolution are in favor of gaining access to nuclear weapons and a cautious assessment on the part of the intelligence sources indicates that Iran's nuclear program is currently noncohesive and in its rudimentary stages. The PRC has considerable capability in nuclear technology and the Beijing authorities have officially admitted to the sale of this technology to Iraq, Algeria, and Pakistan.

The same newspaper described Beijing-Tehran relations as extremely cordial, adding that in the past 10-12 years, the PRC has sold large quantities of weapons to Iran. Tokyo and Moscow did not wish to lag behind in being affected by this rumor and expressed concern over PRC-Iran cooperation in the nuclear field! They stated that if the above were true they would be forced to take appropriate measures!

It is worth mentioning that regarding social and cultural relations as well as in its political balances, the PRC keeps the necessary considerations in mind. This is borne out by the fact that on the controversial issue of exporting nuclear technology to Iran, the PRC stressed that in its exports it firmly ensures adherence to the principles of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], including the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology and non-transfer to a third country.

From this viewpoint, the PRC and Iran, within the framework of mutual relations, have given priority to issues that are far removed from the tension, blackmail, and instability in the region. When the United States realizes that it is not able to mar relations between Iran and the PRC, it will certainly seek other chimerical pretexts for creating obstructions and damaging relations between the two countries. In order to isolate Iran and the PRC on the political and international level, the United States accuses them of violation of human rights. The PRC is charged with maltreatment of the Muslims in its northern province of Sinkiang and of exporting nuclear technology to the countries of southwest Asia.

Similarly, Iran is declared an opponent of the Middle East peace trend and is accused of government-sponsored terrorism and similar issues. Despite all this, the PRC and Iran have displayed a high degree of restraint and openmindedness in their foreign policy, which can be considered a principled course in reciprocal relations.

The PRC foreign minister attended the 48th UN General Assembly session, at which he described the old order as based on unequal relations and explained that such an order was anachronistic. He added that the world of the future should not merely be geared to the interests and privileges of the greater powers and international affairs should not be the monopoly of the larger and stronger countries. Even though the United States and the former Soviet Union had concurred on the reduction of nuclear arms, the presence of a vast arsenal of non-conventional weapons gives a different message. The policy of force still prevails in the world and the greater countries still exert economic pressure on all countries, thus seeking to increase the chasm between the countries of the north and the south.

The PRC believes that conditions should be created for the development of the Third World countries to establish peace and security in the world. Equality among governments in mutual relations and non-intervention in their internal affairs is a principle which—from the PRC perspective—should be applied to all countries without exception. In this regard, the PRC believes that a survey of the human rights situation should not be permitted to tarnish the sovereignty of countries as human rights and basic freedom of human beings should be applied equally to all.



## PAKISTAN

### U.S. Demand for Nuclear Plant Inspections Rejected

BK0104064794 Rawalpindi NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu  
30 Mar 94 p 10

[Editorial: "Nuclear Program—Are Our Hands Tied, or Will They Be Broken?"]

[Text] World-renowned Pakistani scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan says his hands have been tied. If he utters even one word, explanations are sought from higher authorities, fearing that the word may be misinterpreted and our aid may be stopped. Pakistan's nuclear program began as a reaction to India's nuclear explosion and to guarantee our security. The world knows that our program is solely for peaceful purposes, because Pakistan has no aggressive designs. On the other hand, India has fought three wars with Pakistan, and by dismembering Pakistan in 1971 it proved that it finds Pakistan's existence unacceptable. Following the fall of East Pakistan, India is looking for the opportunity to grab what remains of Pakistan.

India's other neighbors are also tired of this. The Maldives and Sri Lanka have already been the victims of its aggression and Bhutan has been blockaded economically. Except for Pakistan and China, India's neighboring countries are not in a position to challenge it. That is why India's nuclear program has a direct bearing on Pakistan. India, having been defeated by China in 1962, is unable to indulge in confrontation with China. That is why it has adopted a reconciliatory path to settle its border dispute with China. There has been no change in its designs against Pakistan, however. Even now Indian leaders are threatening a limited war with Pakistan.

There are disputes between Pakistan and India over Kashmir and Siachen. India has still not accepted Pakistan's existence wholeheartedly. If India were not entangled in its own domestic problems, and if it was not afraid of Pakistan's nuclear program, it would probably have attacked Pakistan by now. It would have been very difficult for Pakistan to face Indian aggression with conventional weapons. India has increased its defense budget by 20 percent this year. Its Army is four times bigger than ours and there is no comparison between India and Pakistan in the naval field following the expansion of India's Navy. In air defense, too, India's capability is double than that of Pakistan, even though we are not weak in this field. During his term of office, General Mirza Aslam Beg disclosed that Pakistan is capable of fighting a war with India for up to 32 days. Knowledgeable sources say that this capability has decreased rather than increased with the passage of time.

The only thing left for Pakistan is the nuclear deterrent, which guarantees its security and protection, but the valiant United States is dead against it. In addition to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, former Army Chief Gen.

Mirza Aslam Beg admitted that Pakistan's nuclear program was capped in 1990, but the valiant United States is still not satisfied. Washington suspects that Pakistan has made further advances in this field despite capping its program; that is why it is insisting on inspection of the installations instead of securing assurances from the president or the prime minister. Nuclear inspections lead to the destruction of nuclear capability, which was shown in the case of Iraq. Ms. Davis, the U.S. under secretary of state, said this recently while testifying before a House of Representatives committee. Talbott, the U.S. deputy secretary of state, is coming to Pakistan in the first week of April to demand the same thing.

The opposition has alleged that the present government has knuckled under to U.S. pressure on the nuclear program and that after having frozen the program, it will now agree to dismantle it. The statement by Kahuta Plant hero Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan hints that his hands have been tied and he is not in a position to make any further advances. Nevertheless, a vain feeling remains that we can make use of the capability we have acquired thus far at any time. It is essential that the government or some institution responsible for national security inform the nation as to whether or not it is true that the hands of the nuclear scientists have only been tied and are not going to be broken according to U.S. wishes. This is essential, because if we are deprived of this capability India will attack us immediately in the absence of any deterrent, and the lollipop [preceding word in English] that the United States wants to give us will not help in any way.

Pakistan learned a lesson from its friendship with the United States in 1965 and 1971, when Washington imposed restrictions on the purchase of spares, rendering our arms and aircraft unusable. Even the U.S. demand of a one-time inspection of our nuclear installations is unacceptable, because if we accept this demand ingenuously we will be subjected to the same treatment Iraq received. The inspection will mean nothing short of the destruction of our capability. Forgoing our nuclear program for the sake of U.S. aid—given in the form of loans with interest at the cost of our honor and security—will be an utterly foolish act. Nations do not exist merely to fill their stomachs. Their foremost priority is to walk shoulder to shoulder with other nations with honor and dignity. By receiving a loan with interest that Washington offers us in the name of military and economic aid, we may be able to overcome our present difficulties, which are not real but are the creation of the major powers and our hostile neighbor. On the other hand, it will completely ruin our honor and fame as a daring, dynamic, and principled nation which both India and the United States fear. We must keep in mind where the secret of our strength and honor lies, because if we are deprived of it, the F-16's and the World Bank and IMF loans will serve no purpose. If we have to accept the hegemony of the Hindus and live under their domination, then why did we struggle for the establishment of Pakistan? It is the government's responsibility to remove

all doubts and suspicions that have been created by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's statement.

#### U.S. Nonproliferation Proposals Discussed

BK3103111394 Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
in English 31 Mar 94 p 10

[Editorial: "Pursuing Nuclear Nonproliferation"]

[Text] The United States has now, reportedly, sought to expand the framework of the proposed five-nation conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia. The proposal envisages India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States together working out a formula for a nuclear-free South Asia. India, however, has been reluctant to participate in any such conference on the grounds that it is not prepared to limit consideration of nonproliferation strategies aimed only at South Asia. It has recently reiterated this position during the course of a visit by the US assistant secretary of state for South Asia. India's contention is that in the presence of a nuclear-armed China it is not possible for it to consider capping its nuclear programme.

Now the US proposal to expand the framework to include Britain, France, Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be seen as a way of bringing more pressure to bear upon the two sides to work out some kind of an acceptable arrangement. The current US emphasis does not appear to be on absolute nuclear disarmament. The effort is now directed at getting the two sides, at least in the initial stage, to freeze their existing arsenals at current levels. The objective of a roll-back would be pursued at a later stage. As a part of this graduated approach, also, Pakistan has repeatedly signalled its willingness to undertake the necessary non-proliferation measures in tandem with a similar policy on the part of India. The latter has, however, continued to invoke the argument of a nuclear China as well as the need to discuss any such measures not by reference just to South Asia but in a much broader, global, context. In a sense, this proposal by including among the participants all the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as Japan and the IAEA does meet India's demands for a broader context for discussing the issue of nonproliferation. But how much help this will be in getting India to make any meaningful change in its rigid position on the issue remains to be seen. In any such context Pakistan could also find itself being subjected to increasing pressure by powerful global and regional actors. It is important, therefore, for Pakistan's policy-makers to identify its policy options carefully in this regard, beyond the understandable linkage with India's nuclear programme that it has continued to emphasise. There appears to be a heightened US interest in Pakistan's nuclear programme as demonstrated by its recent offer to allow the sale of 38 F-16s that Pakistan has already paid for in exchange for a verifiable capping of its nuclear programme. The upcoming visit by the US deputy secretary of state is also in the same context. While there appears to be general consensus in Pakistan

on rejecting this offer it is interesting that it has been opposed also by Senator Pressler as well as Indian policy-makers, perhaps as a result of the apprehension that it will leave Pakistan with the ability to assemble a limited number of nuclear devices in short order while augmenting the ability of its air force, not least in the department of nuclear weapons delivery, in considerable measure. In any case Pakistan, while remaining mindful of its own security interest and the options available, should welcome the proposals to discuss the various aspects of the nonproliferation issue in a broader framework. Among other things, it should help in subjecting India's case for a voiding any meaningful response to Pakistan's various initiatives for a nuclear-free South Asia to a thorough review by the international community.

#### Paper Views U.S. Offer of F-16's, Nonproliferation Issue

BK2603115894 Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
in English 26 Mar 94 p 8

[Editorial: "The U.S. Proposal"]

[Text] The United States, it appears, has stepped up its efforts to get Pakistan to cap its nuclear programme. As an incentive it is now willing to allow Pakistan to take delivery of the 38 F-16s that Pakistan has already paid for but which it cannot have owing to the Pressler Amendment. This is the exchange that is apparently proposed in U.S. non-papers to the Pakistan government. There is no doubt that the acquisition of the advanced aircraft will go a long way in redressing the military imbalance between India and Pakistan, but the price being demanded has to be carefully assessed. Pakistan should not in the process of narrowing the gap in conventional weapon capability between the two countries end up bartering away whatever it has by way of maintaining a nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis India. It is significant that while Pakistan is being made such an offer nothing similar is being proposed to India in order to get it to cap its nuclear programme.

A number of things have to be considered here. To put it bluntly Pakistan no longer has the room for manoeuvre that it enjoyed during the years when US foreign policy placed a high premium on getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan. In a world that has changed in more ways than one since then we will have to proceed carefully in order to meet the requirements of our security on the one hand and to avoid getting totally isolated on the other. While the Kashmir issue remains unsettled and a hostile India increases its defence budget by 20 per cent we cannot afford any laxity with regard to our security concerns. Equally, however, as the experience of the erstwhile Soviet Union falling apart has clearly demonstrated, nuclear capability alone is no guarantee of national strength. Pakistan may continue to insist on linking whatever steps it takes in the direction of nuclear non-proliferation with India's actions in this context. At the same time, however, it should also avoid the pitfall of

getting into a debilitating nuclear arms race with India that will impose relatively far greater costs on it. To that extent it is for Pakistan to determine first what it considers as the necessary minimum in terms of its nuclear capability and then examine the US proposals. According to one report the US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel, currently visiting India, has said that the sale of F-16s to Pakistan is linked to a major non-proliferation step on the part of Pakistan. Just what kind of a step we can take in this direction should be a matter of careful deliberation of all aspects relating to our security. What she has said on the subject could well be taken to mean that Pakistan's existing means of nuclear deterrence would not be affected by the US proposal of stopping the production of nuclear material for weapons and verification of this step. If so, this could have significant implications for the choices Pakistan has. In any case the visit of the US Deputy Secretary of State to New Delhi and Islamabad early next month as well as that of Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff at about the same time to Washington will be important in terms of ascertaining the details of the proposal. Before making any definite response or counter-proposals the government would do well to take the opposition into confidence and the latter should refrain from using an issue of such crucial significance in terms of our security for the purpose of gaining political mileage.

#### **Former Army Chief Beg Views Nuclear Issue**

BK3103131994 Karachi DEFENCE JOURNAL  
in English Jan-Feb 94 pp 19-21

[Article by General Mirza Aslam Beg, former Chief of the Army Staff: "Nuclear Programme and Political Ramblings"]

[Text] Our atomic programme, once again is deeply enmeshed in rumours. The political higher-ups are incessantly issuing statements which are only accentuating the agony of our people and adding to their confusion. Apprehensions are mounting as mutual accusations are clouding the reality. Besides pointing fingers at each other, the politicians are contributing to the image tarnishing of the Army. The severity of blames being tossed lead to an inevitable impression as if the decision to continue with the atomic programme or to strangle it rests entirely with the Army and that the politicians are utterly helpless. The present writer is the perpetual scapegoat, and many 'wondrous' acts are being dumped into his 'accomplishment baggage,' of which he is not even aware of. "Strange are the doings of beauty" goes an Urdu adage. The singular motive of this drive seems to be to extricate the politicians from their responsibility, and to insinuate as if the Army was the sole arbiter of the decision either to pursue the atomic plan or to nail it down. The recent verdict of the out-going caretaker Prime Minister, Mr. Moin Qureshi, that the Army has the final say in the political dynamics of the country is an explicit assertion to this effect.

The present climate of stressful uncertainty with respect to the nuclear issue is an awful load on the nerves of the nation. It seems, therefore, necessary to lift the mask to unravel the reality.

It must be mentioned here that it was Richard Barlow—an American, placed in Islamabad to monitor Pakistan's nuclear programme, who had unequivocally asserted that Pakistan had acquired the nuclear capability in 1987, and this very year his 'report' had come into wide circulation, but the people at the helm of affairs in the USA did not pay any heed to it. Far from taking notice, a process of enquiry was initiated against him. (Reference to Seymour Hersh report entitled "On the Nuclear Edge") Why did it so happen? The most vital reason was that at that time, the gravest battle against the Soviet Union was being waged in Afghanistan, and the US had put all its weight on the scale in favour of the Mojahedin. Using Pakistan as a conduit, it was lending all support to the Afghan freedom-fighters, and it did not deem it expedient at that critical and delicate moment that it should risk spoiling relations with Pakistan. Oblivious of the restraints of principles, the Bush administration, from 1987 to 1989, continued for three years to certifying that Pakistan did not possess any nuclear capability. [sentence as published] (Refer to Seymour Hersh report: "On the Nuclear Edge.") No sooner did the Soviet forces step out of Afghanistan in 1989, it suddenly dawned upon the US that Pakistan had succeeded in its nuclear capability acquisition, and Mr Richard Barlow's report was used as a testimony and Pakistan was accused crossing the "Red Light." There was thus no respite in the vicious propaganda onslaught against Pakistan, and the US pressure kept on accelerating. Its military aid was suspended, and the economic aid substantially curtailed. The pressure tactic was employed to have Pakistan abandon its nuclear mission so as to regress it back to a harmless threshold.

Pakistan, to tell the truth, had embarked upon all the nuclear steps simultaneously, and these stages are no secret to anyone. In all the reference books these are explicitly mentioned. For the benefit of the readers, these are spelt out as follows:

- The enrichment of the Uranium up to 95 percent and above.
- Preparation of the device by integrating all its elements.
- The laboratory test of the different elements of the device.
- The final test of the integrated system. This can be accomplished either by detonation, which is termed 'Hot Test' or through a 'Cold Test,' without it.
- Developing the delivery system—through special aeroplane or missile technology.

As stated earlier, Pakistan had developed this capability in 1987, but the 'slings' and "arrows" against it were



triggered in 1990 for the ostensible reason that the Soviet forces had left the Afghan soil. The US security scenario had metamorphosed and Pakistan was the chosen target for the strangulation of its 'nuclear' neck.

It would be in the fitness of thing to say that the process of freezing the first stage of atomic programme had actually started in January 1989, i.e. after the decision taken in a conference, co-chaired by the then President Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the then Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. It was a deliberate and consensus decision, about which the Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto was fully aware of her allegation that she was kept in the dark about the nuclear programme contains no substance.

To set the record right, it is appropriate to state the fact that in 1988, after Mohtarma Benazir's government had assumed power after the elections, a meeting was held in the Presidency during January of 1989, to deliberate on the nuclear issue. The then President Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Mohtarma Bhutto the Prime Minister - the then Chief of the Army Staff (this writer) and three other very responsible persons had attended this meeting. A detailed discussion took place and all the crucial aspects of the issue were evaluated. Taking the overall situational imperatives and the national interest into perspective, all the members unanimously reached the assessment that Pakistan had acquired the requisite nuclear capability, vitally needed for its security and that it has significantly added to its defensive strength by achieving a "credible deterrence."

After recognising this reality, a consensus based decision was reached in which there was no overt or covert pressure from the Army at all. In view of the global scenario, the regional security, and the pressing needs of economic aid, it was decided that only in the first phase, i.e., the stage of Uranium enrichment, Pakistan should temporarily put a "restraint on its efforts" or so to say, a "policy of restraints" was adopted. In other words, there was to be only a lull period so far as the first stage was concerned. The research activities however, were to continue in all the remaining stages so that at the time of an emergency, the nation would be able to cope up with the situation. This decision was taken after thorough and indepth deliberations. As the then Chief of the Army Staff, this writer would like to remind that no pressure of any kind was exerted by him. Whatever is now being attributed to this scribe has no bearing on reality. In the wake of the consensus decision, there was 'No freeze' and 'No capping' whatsoever.

As a result of "freezing" of phase 1 of the programme, i.e. enrichment only up to 3 per cent, subsequently, phase 2 got automatically frozen, because of lack of the "basic material," i.e., enriched weapon grade uranium. This process of "freezing" continued during the tenure of Mian Nawaz Sharif's prime ministership as well. Voices of "freeze" and "roll-back" are being heard now, and the political figures have transformed this sensitive issue into an 'infantile playground,' merely for political

ends while the nation is gasping into the whirlpool of hope and despair with dazed amazement.

The situation has now come where the US is intensifying its pressure on Pakistan to roll back the programme. It is their avowed demand that Pakistan should exterminate the capability which it has acquired after years of toil and enormous sacrifice. This was not acceptable to Pakistan. After Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto's ouster from the government, when Mian Nawaz Sharif was saddled into power, he also pursued the same policy, despite the magnitude of the mounting pressure from the US. The magnitude of the problem and the recalcitrant approach of the US can be assessed from the fact that to cripple us militarily and economically, the Pressler Amendment was fully imposed upon us. The military aid was totally stopped and the economic assistance was only negligible. This state of affairs continued till the tenure of this writer, which expired in August 1991. Whatever has happened since then is outside the scope of his knowledge. The irony is that without knowing full facts, the character assassination of the writer is being done since long and that this is by a deliberate design. To say that the writer was instrumental in the nuclear freezing or that it was imposed on the government, is totally outside the pale of reality.

Based on his conscientiously determined vision, the writer still maintains that to give up the nuclear capability would be tantamount to committing a national suicide. To acquire this capability is totally in congruence with our defence requirements. The nation is unnecessarily being subjected to doubts and apprehensions, which is not right. Without mincing words, the writer would emphatically reassert: The atomic plan was not frozen. Only the enrichment of uranium was temporarily delayed through a well deliberated decision. If any government has subsequently "frozen" it, this should be subjected to enquiry by the present regime and the nation must be taken into confidence. If at all it has really been "frozen" it is in our supreme interest that the programme be reactivated from where it was broken.

Pakistan is presently placed at a difficult choice point. It can continue with the animated suspense-neither "yes" nor "no" stand-and keep on accusing each other, while the nation remains in a state of perpetual quandary. The other alternative could be to concede to the pressure and either "freeze" or "cap" our nuclear programme and later on by rolling it back, extract, in exchange, all the favours from the US. There is yet a third possibility. We learn to live with the style and grace of a sovereign nation and make no compromises on vital national issues. This indeed is a difficult decision but to circumvent it, in the opinion of this writer, is nothing short of high treason.

This writer once again would like to reiterate his submission that the issue of "freezing" of the plan be thoroughly investigated, mere mudslinging is no solution to the problem. To camouflage it in the veil of "Secrecy" is no longer possible. The nation is very impatient to know,

under what compulsions was Pakistan's atomic programme 'frozen' and why is the US so adamant to inspect our nuclear installations?

Notwithstanding the Government and the Opposition's stand on this issue, this writer is fully convinced that the people and those deeply interested in the security of the country, must in unison accept the reality that our defence requirements could only be met if we link our nuclear programme with that of India. We must unequivocally tell the US that any unilateral or partisan approach would not be acceptable to Pakistan.

#### **Scrapping Nuclear Program for F-16's Opposed**

*BK2803143994 Rawalpindi NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu  
25 Mar 94 p 10*

[Editorial: "F-16's in Lieu of Nuclear Program—Unacceptable Deal"]

[Text] Lynn Davis, the U.S. under secretary of state, has said the United States is ready to supply F-16 aircraft to Pakistan on the condition that Islamabad halts its nuclear program. The U.S. under secretary of state added that the administration will ask Congress to lift the restrictions on military aid so it can hand over the F-16 aircraft to Pakistan for which payment has already been made, but in return Islamabad will have to give assurances that it will not make any further advances in its nuclear program.

Pakistan has repeatedly assured the international community that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes, that it does not intend to manufacture a nuclear bomb, and that it does not harbor any aggressive designs against any country, even though India has already exploded a nuclear device and committed two acts of aggression against Pakistan. The United States has maintained a policy of overlooking the nuclear programs of India, South Africa, and Israel, but its strategy vis-a-vis Islamic countries—especially Pakistan—has been to prevent them from acquiring modern technology at all costs. When the former Soviet Union was alive as another superpower, the U.S. attitude was somewhat flexible; but with the disintegration of the USSR, the United States—swollen with pride at being the sole superpower—has been continuously pressuring Pakistan. This is why it has not only approved discriminatory legislation in the form of the Pressler Amendment, but has also refused to deliver aircraft for which we have already made payment.

If Pakistan were situated in a peaceful region without such a crafty and cunning neighbor as India, it would not have needed to start a nuclear program or spend a large chunk of its resources on defense. Pakistan—which has faced two aggressions and lost half of its territory—cannot afford to demonstrate any weakness or enter any deal regarding its nuclear program. The only reason India has not attacked Pakistan so far, despite its intentions, is the nuclear deterrent. It is also a fact that the United States has shown it is not Pakistan's trusted

friend. After the way it turned away from Pakistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and tried to improve relations with India, it is impossible for Islamabad to accept Washington's offer, abandon its nuclear program, and in exchange rely on U.S. weapons or try to live with U.S. promises that proved unreliable during the 1965 and 1971 wars.

Pakistan has forwarded several proposals to eliminate regional tension and declare South Asia a nuclear-free zone. These proposals have included a nonaggression treaty and a five-nation conference that has been supported by the United States. India, however, has never given a positive or favorable response to these proposals, thereby proving its aggressive designs. The United States has been pressuring Pakistan to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT]. Pakistan is ready to sign the NPT on the condition that India does the same. Even this is not in Pakistan's interests, because it does not have the strength to face India with conventional weapons. Moreover, India is not even ready to sign the NPT. The United States has also been pressuring Pakistan to open Kahuta and other nuclear research centers for inspection. This is tantamount to eliminating Pakistan's nuclear program, because the inspections would be the same as those carried out against the Iraqi nuclear installations, as a result of which the United States silenced Iraq. If Washington thinks that any Pakistani government could remain in power after committing such a blunder, it is mistaken. The U.S. assistant secretary of state is due to arrive in Pakistan in a few days; the Pakistani Government must not demonstrate any weakness in this regard.

If Washington—ignoring the ethics of trade—intends to demand a quid pro quo for the delivery of those F-16 aircraft that were paid for in cash, it is outrageous. The government must stand firm rather than bowing to this blackmail and meet the situation by keeping the nation informed. There is no need to indulge in confrontation with the United States. In the context of its national interests and regional situation, however, Washington can be convinced that its discriminatory attitude is harming its own interests and its image is being tarnished in the eyes of the Islamic world. In this context, the government should apprise the opposition of all the details and tell the United States that we want friendship, not submission.

#### **Interior Minister Says No Rollback of Nuclear Program**

*BK2703125794 Islamabad THE NEWS in English  
27 Mar 94 p 11*

[By Khawaja Asbur Saleem]

[Excerpt] Chakwal—The federal minister for interior, Major General (Retd) Nasirullah Khan Bahur, said the country's nuclear programme could not be rolled back which was started by our leader late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

This, he stated while addressing the oath-taking ceremony of the District Bar Association, Chakwal, here Saturday. The federal minister re-affirmed that nuclear power plant is a part of the country and it would be continued for the peaceful purposes and no compromise would be made on this issue.

Later, replying to various questions put by the members of the bar, the interior minister told that there are certain problems for the separation of judiciary and executive because there is a law and order problem in the country as more than 50,000 foreign refugees are present in the country.

Bahar said that we had moved an application for the revision of Supreme Court verdict to extend some more time for this purpose. He was of the view that at present situation this process of separation of judiciary and executive would harm the national interest. However,

he confirmed that if Supreme Court would not revise its previous decision, then we would definitely obey the direction of the court.

Replying to another question he regretted the behaviour of opposition on the Kashmir issue.

Replying to another question, he praised the role of lawyers in the Movement of Restoration of Democracy (MRD).

Earlier, in his welcome address, Ch Mehmood Akhter, president of District bar apprised the minister of the problems being faced by the District Bar.

The secretary general of the bar, Mr Amir Bhutti also spoke on this occasion.

Later, the federal interior minister also addressed an open kutchery [court] at District Complex, Civil Rest House.



## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Estonia Say Russian Officers Selling Radioactive Materials

OW0304115994 Moscow Russian Television and Dubl Networks in Russian 0000 GMT 3 Apr 94

[Announcer-read report over video; from the "Aty-Baty" program]

[Text] (Yuriy Pikul), general director of the Estonian Security Police, accused Russian military unit commanders deployed in the territory and senior officers at the Tallinn garrison of trading in radioactive materials. He said that at least five highly radioactive articles made of metal were sold to the West from Estonia. He explained how the command of the [place-name indistinct] harbor in Tallinn sold two air-cushion vessels for scrap whose engine components emitted 200 roentgens per hour of radioactivity. Specialists consider a person's unprotected exposure to such a source of radioactivity for three hours to be lethal. After the vessels were scrapped, the metal was sold to Finland. However, several turbine sections containing radioactive cobalt disappeared without a trace.

According to the statement made by (Viktor Mikhaylovich Krug), assistant to the chief military procurator, the Russian Federation military procuracy possesses no facts or material concerning the sale by the Northern Group of Forces of components or other items containing radioactive isotopes. For its part, the Russian Federation military procuracy is prepared to begin the immediate investigation of such a situation. [video shows external shots of the military area gate, military vehicles, bicycle riders entering area, shots of buildings over a barbed-wire-topped fence]

### Russia, Private Firms Luring Ukrainian Nuclear Scientists

AU0104172794 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 31 Mar 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Jobless Cyclotron"]

[Text] The Kiev Nuclear Research Institute at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences is experiencing difficult times, as with all science. Our country's only cyclotron, which cost us 15 billion karbovantsi, has remained idle for six months. There is not enough money for the energy and heating that it requires. Just as there is no money at the Academy of Sciences, the government is also in no hurry to help the scientists. The Institute's financing from the budget is only 40 percent....

As a result, there is not enough money to conduct basic studies. It is as though they have become unnecessary. Specialists, who even now are not so numerous, are looking for other jobs. For example, in Russia, where salaries are higher and where there are possibilities for advancement. However, perhaps, the worst thing about

this is that young people are leaving the Institute—commercial structures lure them away. In the course of time, Ukraine may find itself without nuclear specialists. At the same time, we have 15 nuclear power stations, and, by the year 2000, it is envisaged to have at least another five units commissioned.

## RUSSIA

### Yeltsin Dismisses CW Committee Chairman

LD0704191094 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1740 GMT 7 Apr 94

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 7 Apr—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today signed an edict dismissing Anatoliy Kuntsevich from the post of chairman of the committee for conventional problems relating to chemical and biological weapons under the Russian president for infringing his professional duties. Kuntsevich found out about this edict, or rather his staff did, through an NTV television report.

You will recall that Kuntsevich led the committee for destroying chemical weapons [CW] and his name was mentioned in connection with the Vil Mirzoyanov case. The recently freed scientist himself, and his colleague Lev Fedorov—who had revealed departmental secrets of the military-chemical lobby—talk of Kuntsevich as being one of their main opponents.

### CBW Deputy Chief Denies SUNDAY TIMES Allegations

PM3003084294 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 94 p 3

[Remarks by Lieutenant General of Medical Services Valentin Ivanovich Yevstigneyev, deputy chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Forces, "at the request of the Russian Defense Ministry Information and Press Directorate": "The Military Do Not Deceive Their Commander in Chief"—first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The UK newspaper THE SUNDAY TIMES published an article the other day which asserts, citing anonymous intelligence sources and the testimony of three "defectors," that the Russian Defense Ministry is carrying out work on a program for the creation of biological weapons without the knowledge of the country's president.

At the request of the Russian Defense Ministry Information and Press Directorate, Lieutenant General of Medical Services Valentin Ivanovich Yevstigneyev, deputy chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Forces, comments on these assertions.

**Yevstigneyev:** First of all I wish to note that the continuing campaign in the West to accuse Russia of carrying out work on the creation of biological weapons is patently intended to divert public attention from their own programs which contravene the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons.

As is well known, Russia advocates the setting up of a large-scale mechanism for verification of compliance with this convention. But such a mechanism is evidently not in the interests of those who are continuing to improve a scientific, technical, and industrial potential which could be used for the production of biological weapons.

We have observed that peaks in the activeness of this campaign coincide, as a rule, with major international talks concerning the 1972 Convention. The present press item is no exception. It came out on the eve of a session of the preparatory committee for a special conference to examine possible measures for verification of compliance with the 1972 Convention, at which the Russian side intends to continue work aimed at setting up a mechanism for verification of compliance with the said treaty.

As for the accusations against the Russian Defense Ministry, I wish to remind the author of the SUNDAY TIMES item that in accordance with Edict No. 390 of the President of the Russian Federation, 11 April 1992, all work contrary to the requirements of the 1972 Convention was stopped. Verification of the fulfillment of the said edict on Russian territory is carried out by the Committee on Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the President of the Russian Federation.

In 1993 amendments were made to legislation, making provision for criminal accountability for the development, production, acquisition, or storage of biological weapons.

Every year our country submits to the United Nations an exhaustive report on its biological facilities and activity associated with protection against biological weapons. Russia's biological facilities, including those belonging to the Defense Ministry, have repeatedly been visited by representatives of the mass media and the local authorities and by foreign experts.

Back in November 1992 an independent commission of leading Russian scientists and foreign experts visited the Institute of Ultrapure Biological Products, at which the United States and Britain suspected that work was being carried out on the "superplague" mentioned in the article. The commission found the institute's activity to be fully in accordance with the requirements of the 1972 Convention. Immediately following the completion of the commission's work, the U.S. and British representatives also voiced no complaints about the work being carried out at the Institute.

So any suspicions concerning violations by Russia of the ban on the development, production, or storage of biological weapons are completely unfounded.

### **Commentator on Reported Biological Weapons Development**

*LD2903191894 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 29 Mar 94*

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] A spokesman for Russia's Defense Ministry flatly refused on Monday [28 March] the reports of Western media on the Russian military allegedly going ahead with the development of biological weapons. Our observer Vladislav Kozyakov has some details on this subject:

A spokesman for the information and press department made a statement from the Defense Ministry. He told ITAR-TASS that Russia is neither developing nor producing biological weapons. The statement was causing a sensation but absolutely groundless reports were made these days by some Western newspapers. For example, the SUNDAY TIMES published by the London-based TIMES produced a horrible picture alleging Russia has at its disposal some super plague powder which can destroy half a million people if 440 (tonnes) of it were air dropped. What is more, the newspaper reported that the West has no antidote for this agent. It goes without saying that the report provided no evidence to prove this sensation. It couldn't be otherwise, since there is no such agent whatsoever. The author of the article, sent from Washington, Mr. James Adams, refers to the testimonies which had allegedly been made by three Russian defectors. One of them gave some information to the CIA, the other two did so to the British secret service. The names of these persons remain of course unidentified—as a result nobody can verify whether these people really exist.

The developments remind one of the practices utilized by special services during the Cold War period, when the East and the West were competing for who is better at darkening its potential enemy. It was just at that time when the fabrications were spread all over the world about the AIDS virus having been released from the Pentagon laboratories to spread around the globe.

One can only wonder why even now the mass media is giving reports with misleading information capable of sowing distrust in international relations, the more so that the current pattern of relations between Russia, the United States, and Britain allows these countries to resolve their own problems—especially those involved in mass destruction weapons—proceeding from mutual frankness. It was a tripartite Russian-American-British agreement to achieve this concluded as early as 1992. [sentence as heard] The document of the agreement clearly stipulates all the sides concerned can inspect the facilities which had been used for the production of biological weapons.

The main question is: Why did this hoax about Russian biological weapons come into being just now? One of the possible answers to it can be found in the SUNDAY TIMES itself. This is evidence that some people are trying to create suspicion among Russian leadership. Could it be for this very reason that the conclusion can be drawn some Defense Ministry officials could ostensibly be deceiving the president in this respect?

However, another possibility is also quite plausible. In Washington and London there appear again some groups which would like to damage the prestige of Russia as a great democratic and peace-loving power. At the same time they are eager to put a fly into the ointment of the current process when constructive partnership among Washington, Moscow, and London is now gaining strength.

#### **Local Opposition to Planned Bryansk CW Destruction Plant**

PM3103141994 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 31 Mar 94 First Edition p 8

[Anatoliy Grachev report: "Wasn't Chernobyl Enough?"]

[Text] Bryansk—For many years a strictly guarded facility existed in the rayon center of Pochep in Bryansk Oblast. Nobody there apart from the oblast party committee first secretary knew what was behind the barbed wire. Now the shroud of secrecy has been lifted and the residents of Pochep have found out that chemical weapons are being stored nearby.

But it was another discovery that particularly bothered them: It is planned to build a facility here to destroy the said weapons.

Local residents posed the reasonable question: "Surely Bryansk Oblast, which was contaminated by radiation from Chernobyl, should not also become an area for destroying chemical weapons?" Signatures are being collected in opposition to the plant's construction.

#### **'Secret Report' Cited on Nuclear Weapons Sales** JN0504091994

[Editorial Report] Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic on 1 April publishes on pages 34-36 an approximately 3,500-word report from Moscow by Pavel Davydov on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the breakaway republics of the former Soviet Union and on sales of these weapons and sophisticated technology to Third World and other nations. The report cites dangers threatening many nations as a result of the Soviet republics' lack of control over their nuclear arsenal. It says the Russian intelligence and security agencies are incapable of protecting the world from the risks inherent in the proliferation of nuclear bombs, radioactive agents, missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction.

The magazine publishes highlights of a "secret report" submitted by the Russian Counterespionage Service to Russian President Boris Yeltsin "a few days ago." This classified report contains a "clear warning that it is impossible to prevent thefts, smuggling, and secret trade, which is on the rise in military plants and sensitive laboratories. The report also points out that the states that broke away from the Soviet Union are also unable to protect the dangerous installations they have inherited. These states are selling the installations to dealers who come from Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, and other nations, or to trade firms that specialize in gun-running. Sometimes, plants are being sold, along with all their equipment, weapons, and experts. The report gives evidence that 900 thefts from military and nuclear plants and 700 thefts of secret technology were reported only during the second half of 1993, including nuclear weapons to Iran and Pakistan."

The report says that as a result of the unplanned reorganization of security agencies in Russia and the defects in the new structure of Russian security, Russian military institutions and plants, science institutes, and important laboratories have been deprived of the protection of the official security agencies. No special security agencies were established to protect those installations due to "lack of funds and the general deterioration in the country."

The report adds that what makes the situation even more difficult is that the newly independent republics do not know how to handle or get rid of the military and other plants on their territory. The leaders of those republics think the best way to remove these weapons and plants is by selling them to the highest bidder.

The report cites examples of the selling of weapons of mass destruction to other nations. In November 1993, a ship carrying 40 families of Russian refugees arrived in the city of Isterkhan from Turkmenistan, including six families whose parents had worked in a secret workshop of the ammunition depot that belongs to the former Soviet war naval fleet. In this workshop, nuclear containers for torpedoes and sea mines were tested and most of them were sent to the Black Sea fleet. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan decided that it did not need the containers, so the entire depot was sold within a year. The buyers were Iranians and Pakistanis. Also, a powder plant was sold in Uzbekistan when this republic saw that it no longer needs the plant and could not turn it into civilian production. The report adds: "We can give dozens of examples of this kind. The weapons of mass destruction spread all over the Third World from all the republics of the former Soviet Union because of the lack of control and protection exercised in the past by the KGB. These weapons can easily fall into the hands of irresponsible adventurers."

The report gives another example of the disappearance of a secret laboratory for scientific research in the area of



chemical weapons and laser technology in a city in Kyrgyzstan. The buyer is unknown.

The report goes on to say that none of the republics of the former Soviet Union exercises state control over nuclear security, except for Russia which has a government committee to monitor nuclear activities. Even this committee has limited tasks.

The report devotes a chapter to the future of scientists, specialists in military industries, and nuclear experts. It discloses that "more than a third of the scientists and specialists in the nuclear field and highly sophisticated technology, who total 3,000 people that used to work in the Soviet Union, have left the country and now work at major scientific institutions in the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, and Sweden."

### **Debts, Lack of Security, Supplies Threaten Nuclear Industry**

*LD0604152594 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1100 GMT 6 Apr 94*

[Passages within quotation marks recorded; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Video shows archive footage of special security units training to defend nuclear sites, picketers outside Moscow Government house, trade union deputy chairman] **Correspondent:** Experts are already worried about the situation on Russian nuclear power stations. For example, it has become perfectly clear that the security system for strategic sites, which include nuclear power stations, will have to be completely rebuilt. Special services employees say that since the Ministry of Internal Affairs took over the command of the special group Vypel, which specializes in preventing any terrorist threat, this subunit has practically ceased to exist and there is no one to defend nuclear sites.

At the same time there is also many other problems. The state owes half a trillion rubles to employees of nuclear stations. This has forced them to send picketers to Moscow. The leadership of the nuclear industry trade unions says that nuclear power stations are experiencing difficulties not only with wages:

**I. Fomichev, deputy chairman of the central committee of the nuclear industry trade union, identified by caption:** "There is enough fuel for about a month."

**Correspondent:** A threat of stoppages by nuclear power stations means not only a loss of 12 percent of electric energy. For regions like Chukotka this is a question of life and death.

Only a law prohibiting strikes on strategic sites stops employees of nuclear power stations from going on strike. However, new demands have come from provinces on the last day of authorized pickets of state institutions in Moscow.

**Fomichev:** "Unfortunately, because the government continues to ignore our problems, the workforce is beginning to put forward political demands. Unfortunately the people we voted for, the people whose responsibility is to solve these problems, are not doing it."

### **Participation in Cocom Successor Sought**

*LD3103170894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1341 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Ivantsov]

[Text] Moscow March 31 TASS— Russia would like to take part in the organization which will succeed the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (Cocom), which ceases its existence as of April first according to a decision taken by Cocom's representatives during a meeting held in a suburb of the Hague.

Cocom's "death" symbolizes the disappearance of one more relic from the "Cold War." Cocom was formed in 1949 by the NATO countries with Australia and Japan to establish strict controls over the export of strategically important technologies and raw materials to the socialist bloc countries.

As far as Cocom's "successor" is concerned, it will not be a structure similar to its predecessor, but basically a new organization which should implement an international programme to monitor the movement of arms and dual-use technologies, ITAR-TASS learned from reliable sources.

The new organization should forestall the purchase of such goods for military purposes, but will hopefully not be aimed against one state or group of states.

Work on an agreement concerning the new organization is due to begin in the near future. China, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have announced their interest in being part of the Cocom-successor organization. So far, a decision has been made to found three working groups which will outline the main purposes of the future international institution.

Consultations on the approaches of various countries to the problem of export control will be continued. Russia has already taken part in such negotiations and is ready to continue to play an active role in them on a partner-like basis.

The most important question remains that of working out an effective international control mechanism which will replace the old principles and help maintain the necessary high level of knowledge about the spread of strategic technologies and materials.

### Foreign Ministry Affirms Adherence to Nonproliferation

PM2803123594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Mar 94 First Edition p 6

[Unattributed report: "Meanwhile"]

[Text] We have learned from reliable sources at the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry that Russia is firmly following the line of nuclear nonproliferation, including on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry believes that the sanctions problem is not yet practicable. Sanctions are an extreme measure to be used when all the political possibilities have been exhausted.

According to reports from Seoul, South Korea has placed its 650,000-strong Armed Forces on a heightened state of alert. All leave has been canceled.

Meanwhile, ITAR-TASS reports from Pyongyang, the situation in the DPRK capital remains calm. No changes have as yet been observed which would point to preparations for a possible military conflict.

### Komsomolets Nuclear Warheads Still Intact on Sea Bottom

LD0704195994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1715 GMT 7 Apr 94

[Text] The nuclear warheads of the torpedoes in the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets that sank exactly five years ago in the Norwegian Sea remain intact. Officials in the Northern Fleet's press center told Interfax Thursday that radiometric and spectrometric sampling of the sea water and bottom suggested that there was no plutonium-239 in the spot where the submarine had sunk. The cesium-137 content there was one ten thousandth of the admissible value for drinking water. The gamma radiation at the sea surface ranged from 1.5 to 5 microRoentgen per hour.

The officials also said that the Semyon Dezhnyov research ship was taking samples in the area. According to the April 7 data, the radiation there stayed within background values.

The press center head Vladimir Pyzh emphasized that the Northern Fleet had never intended to make the state of affairs secret and wanted the radiation situation in that area and elsewhere where nuclear ships of other countries had sunk to be reported impartially.

He said that two Soviet and two US submarines had sunk in that area. Pyzh added that the Northern Fleet command wanted reports and forecasts on what was going on or would happen where Komsomolets had sunk to be based on specific tests and accurate data.

### Minister Panov Says DPRK Must Fulfill Treaty Obligation

SK0104085794 Seoul YONHAP in English 0839 GMT 1 Apr 94

[Text] Moscow, April 1 (YONHAP)—Vice Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov, declaring that Russia's position on the North Korean nuclear dispute remains unchanged, has said that North Korea must fulfill its obligations as a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In an interview published in the daily IZVESTIYA Friday, Panov said Moscow would support the U.N. Security Council in adopting a resolution demanding outside inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities.

Commenting on his earlier statement that Russia would have to intervene automatically to militarily assist North Korea under a bilateral treaty if North Korea was attacked, Panov said his remark had been distorted by the press.

The Russian position on the military assistance treaty between the former Soviet Union and North Korea has not changed from what it was a year ago, he said.

Panov said Russia would decide whether to fulfill its obligations under the 1961 treaty with North Korea after considering the differences between then and now and analyzing the situation on the basis of Russia's national interest, while bearing in mind its international obligations including the non-proliferation treaty.

Panov stressed there is no threat of any unprovoked attack on North Korea at present, thus hinting that Moscow has no ground for providing military support to Pyongyang, the newspaper said.

Russia tries to make use of the Korean situation to strengthen its position in Asia, the paper said. But Russia does not want a conflict with Seoul and Washington over this issue, it said, noting that Russia, unlike China, is ready to support a UN Security Council resolution on North Korea.

### Diplomat Says Moscow 'Not Required' To Help DPRK

SK3103053794 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean 31 Mar 94 p 1

[Report by Washington-based correspondent Chin Chang-uk]

[Text] A Russian diplomat in Washington said on 30 March that if North Korea is found to have a nuclear weapon, the Russian Government will not help North Korea militarily even if a Western country, such as the United States, were to take military action, such as preventive bombing, against North Korea regardless of UN agreement.

The Russian diplomat, who requested anonymity, said this in an interview with CHUNGANG ILBO that day. He made it clear that if North Korean development of nuclear weapons is confirmed, Russia will not give assistance to North Korea even if North Korea is attacked militarily because such an attack on North Korea will not fall under the provisions of the military alliance treaty signed between North Korea and the former Soviet Union in 1961.

The Russian diplomat explained that although the military alliance treaty the former Soviet Union signed with North Korea is still valid with Russia's succession to the Soviet Union, Russia is not required to provide military assistance to North Korea when North Korea provokes a war ahead of the other side. Thus, Russia will regard confirmation that North Korea has developed nuclear weapons as provocation by North Korea, he said.

#### **Forum on Severodvinsk Nuclear Waste Disposal Problem Urged**

*PM2803150394 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 19 Mar 94*

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report from Severodvinsk by V. Loyter and D. Rasskazov, identified by caption]

[Text] [170950] [Loyter over video of industrial facilities, with camera homing in on "Zvezdochka" plant] The information ballyhoo around radioactive waste recycling has not bypassed Severodvinsk. This is understandable. Over the past 30 years more than enough problems have accumulated at enterprises of this center of nuclear shipbuilding. While the spent nuclear fuel still has its uses—the fuel rods are sent to the Mayak Combine in the southern Urals—no one is interested in the metal, which also absorbs quite a bit of radiation. The storage facilities built for this purpose at the "Zvezdochka" plant are full to the brim.

In cooperation with specialists from the center of nuclear shipbuilding, the Arkhangelsk Oblast Committee has drawn up a program to ensure nuclear and radiation safety. The oblast leaders have suggested that all departments interested in solving this problem, which is of crucial importance for the population of this entire region and which can no longer be shrugged off, get together in Arkhangelsk. [171042] [video shows "Zvezdochka" plant exterior, interior]

#### **Missile Force Denies Atomic Danger Posed by 10 March Shooting**

*LD2803173794 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 28 Mar 94*

[Text] The press center of the Russian missile force has disclosed that during the recent incident at a strategic military unit in Siberia there was no threat to the population whatsoever.

As has been reported, on 10 March a soldier on duty suddenly opened fire and killed his commanding officer and wounded several other fellow servicemen. The soldiers guarding the military facility refrained from returning fire for fear of hitting the fuel tanks of missiles with nuclear warheads.

According to the statement from the press center of the missile force, the system of the duty roster in such units guarantees nuclear security in ordinary as well as in emergency situations. Information carried by the daily IZVESTIYA about a supposed threat of a nuclear missile conflict is groundless, the statement says.

## **ESTONIA**

#### **Parliament Adopts Law Regulating Transit of Strategic Goods**

*WS0704092494 Tallinn ETA in English 1607 GMT 6 Apr 94*

[“News Release”]

[Text] Estonia's parliament, the Riigikogu, on Wednesday [6 April] approved a law regulating the transit and export of strategic goods.

“Undoubtedly, this is of no special interest to Estonia - I think that during next decades we are not planning to supply us with such weapons,” Estonia's Environment Minister Andres Tarand said on commenting the new law.

The law, however, enables Russia or some other foreign country sell missiles or other weapons to other countries through Estonian ports, Tarand said.

The law initiated by Estonian government regulates export and transit of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, Tarand said while adding he did not approve transit of such environmentally hazardous materials. Such activities, however, provided international rules are observed might bring Estonia economic benefits.

## **UKRAINE**

#### **Energy Committee Head Views Nuclear Power Situation**

*WS0104140094 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1205 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Editorial Report] Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian at 1205 GMT on 31 March carries the 40-minute live “Independence” program on the issue of atomic power plants and nuclear energy in Ukraine. The program is moderated by Serhiy Omelchuk and the guest is Mikhaylo Umanets, chairman of the State Committee for Nuclear Energy (Derzhkomatom). Mikhaylo Umanets speaks Russian throughout the program.



In his introduction, the moderator states that "an economy without power engineering is like a car without an engine." Such an opinion, according to him, can be also expressed with regard to nuclear power engineering. Having stated that the "seemingly most difficult winter" in the history of Ukraine's power engineering has just concluded, the moderator asks Umanets to make some preliminary conclusions "without going into details."

Umanets begins with a statement that "one can be satisfied with the results" and says: "We have fully met our obligations to the state by producing 75 billion kilowatt-hours of energy, that is, 3 billion more than in 1992. Energy produced in Ukraine constituted 33 percent [of all energy production]. We have had 12 incidents at various stations, but, fortunately for us, none of them could be rated as an accident on the international scale NS [as heard], which is now being used throughout the world. I think that our radio listeners already know that this system has seven levels. The seventh degree means the worst accident, of the Chernobyl type. The first three levels are related to minor incidents, while the last four, are the nearest to accidents. So, we have not had any accidents. Of those events, eleven were rated at the first level, and only one—at the second degree. Thus, at first glance, it may seem that we should be satisfied with our results, but, unfortunately, it is not the case. I do not know what your second question will be—maybe, I will answer it without being asked—but we are not satisfied with the results, because this winter, in principle, we have totally exhausted our reserves to accomplish what we have done."

Asked to comment on how nonpayments for energy supplies affect the nuclear power industry, Umanets states that "we have worked for free over these past seven months, or even longer." The reasons for this, he explains, are twofold: "First, the monetary system is not working, and we have permanent debtors who today owe us 1.8 trillion karbovanetses. Second, the tariffs for electrical energy are not being updated in proper time." By now, Umanets continues, many power units are being shut down due to the "spring and summer repair campaign." "However," he states, "we have neither spare parts nor fuel to make these repairs in due time." According to him, the problems of nuclear power engineering could be solved if all the debts were settled with a "ruble exchange rate of 1:7," which was established by the National Bank according to "calculated production costs." "If this is not going to happen," he says, "it is not excluded that a number of power units will not be ready for winter to keep the energy system going." Further, he states: "This morning I saw that the system had a frequency rating of 49.35 Hz. The system is close to disintegration."

The moderator recalls that the Ukrainian-U.S.-Russian trilateral agreement on nuclear disarmament stipulates that Ukraine is to obtain nuclear fuel as compensation for its nuclear warheads. He asks Umanets whether Russia is fulfilling this agreement. Umanets states that

the first shipment with nuclear warheads has been dispatched to Russia and says: "As of today, we have not obtained any fuel. For the time being, I am not able to say when we might receive a shipment. An agreement on the procedures and terms for fuel deliveries has not been signed with the Russian side. The United States has not fulfilled its obligations, either; it has not given initial [pervyye oborotnyye] means for this process—the promised \$60 million. During his visit to Ukraine, the U.S. secretary of defense promised that the \$60 million would be in Russia within ten days of his return to the United States. However, time goes on, and there is still no money. At my level, I have contacts with the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering and Industry, and I know that they have no means with which to pay the factory—and nowadays the factory will not give its nuclear fuel away for free—they have no means to pay the factory to have the fuel shipped here. Therefore, the question must still be resolved at very high levels, in any case, at the Cabinet of Ministers level."

The moderator goes on to ask Umanets to provide some information on the personnel situation at nuclear power facilities, because "there is a trend of nuclear specialists leaving Ukraine to take jobs in the neighboring state." Umanets says that "much good has been done during this year" in the training of nuclear specialists, in particular, "a full-scale training simulator" was established at the Zaporozhskaya Nuclear Power Plant, and preparations were made to establish such a simulator at the Khmel-nitskaya Nuclear Power Plant. "Small-scale simulators," he continues, will be established at the Yuzhnoukray-inska and Rovenskaya plants with French assistance. Ukrainian nuclear specialists, he adds, are being trained in Germany. Next, Umanets states: "This year's outflow of cadres from nuclear plants was a terrible blow to us. There are three reasons for this, and all three of them should be named here: First, the attractiveness of the private sector; this cannot be ignored—many talented people go there. Second, the disintegration of the Soviet Union—it is natural that under these circumstances everyone is free to choose his or her fatherland. However, the most prevailing factor is low salaries." Umanets says that his own salary amounts to around \$40, while his son-in-law, who is working as an engineer at a nuclear power plant in Lithuania, earns over \$300. He adds: "In comparison with Russia, our salaries are six times lower." He also points out that Russia provides nuclear specialists with housing, while Ukraine has problems doing that. Umanets states that "a brain drain has begun" and that "our personnel reserves are almost exhausted, because about 2,500 men left us in 1993." He says that Ukraine has made a move to train its own "national cadres" by opening the faculty of power engineering at the Sevastopol Naval Institute in September 1993, where 72 students have already begun their studies.

The moderator proposes to answer some questions from listeners, which have been received during the program. The first question raises doubt whether it is expedient for

Ukraine to produce its own nuclear fuel rods, which must currently be supplied by Russia. Umanets states that, by using all of Ukraine's technical and scientific potential to produce rods, "the contribution of nuclear fuel to [energy] production costs can be reduced by a factor of two, from 62 percent to about 30 percent." He also says that all the expenditures to produce Ukraine's own nuclear fuel, according to preliminary estimates, can be earned back in no more than four years.

The second question from a listener concerns the disposal of nuclear waste. The moderator adds to this his own questions about the ways to secure the technological processes in the production of Ukraine's nuclear fuel. Umanets begins by saying that "one has to be extremely frank on this issue." He states that there is a need to create a system of nuclear waste disposal in Ukraine. The most important issue, in his opinion, is the disposal of nuclear waste from the Chernobyl disaster; namely, "unit no. 4 at the Chernobyl plant and polluted zones within a 30-km radius."

Answering the moderator's question about "the most probable scheme" for storing nuclear waste, Umanets states that "there should be intermediate depositories for 50-60 years, as well as permanent depositories." Emphasizing that this is his personal opinion, Umanets says that intermediate depositories can be located in the 30-km radius around Chernobyl which "can still play a positive role in Ukraine's national economy, namely in dealings with nuclear waste." With regard to permanent depositories, Umanets says that this issue should be examined by geologists. He adds that he prefers to deal with nuclear waste in England, where geologists have found suitable formations for storing nuclear waste.

Next, the moderator asks Umanets to report on the implementation of an international project to build a new sarcophagus over unit no. 4 at the Chernobyl plant. Umanets states that there is no such international project. In Kiev, he explains, an international contest was held, which selected six projects; the authors of these projects formed "a consortium" to continue work on the "project's economic feasibility." This consortium, Umanets adds, to get money from "foreign banks" for the implementation of its project, has to win "a tender." Umanets did not rule out the possibility that there will be a special fund created for the Chernobyl plant. Talks toward this end, he adds, are already being conducted "at the presidential level." Asked to specify which countries will participate in the project, Umanets names France, Germany, and Great Britain. He adds that there will be no delay in the building of a new sarcophagus if Ukraine gets the money for it.

Asked to comment on the possibility of introducing share capital in Ukraine's nuclear power engineering system, Umanets says that, in his personal opinion, this can be done following the creation of a "nuclear fuel cycle" by Ukraine, the completion of nuclear units, and arrangements for the disposal of nuclear waste.

At the end of the program, Umanets states that his committee will try to pass through the new parliament a law on "privileges" for workers living in the 30-km radius around Chernobyl. He also promises that the committee will do everything to put the largest possible number of power units in operation by next winter.

#### **Money Allotted for Uranium Firms, Nuclear Unit Construction**

*WS0504124694 Lvov MOLODA HALYCHYNA  
in Ukrainian 26 Mar 94 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Billions of Rubles for the Uranium Industry and Nuclear Power Units"]

[Text] Ukraine's Acting Prime Minister Yurkym Zvyahilskyy has recently promised to allocate to the State Committee for Nuclear Power Industry over 5 billion Russian rubles [R] for the development of the uranium industry and R10 billion to complete the construction of five high-readiness nuclear power units, which was halted following an appropriate moratorium.

Oleh Lytvynov, chief of the energy and nuclear inspection section of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Department for Issues of Fuel-Energy Industry, has reported that, indeed, according to a decision adopted at a conference chaired by Yurkym Zvyahilskyy, the government is currently trying to find additional funds totalling 3.6 trillion karbovanetses to complete construction of the nuclear power units. Oleh Lytvynov has also stated that there are sufficient funds in the 1994 state budget for the development of uranium industry.

#### **IAEA Experts View Chernobyl Safety Issues**

##### **Team Examines Plant Safety**

*AU3103130494 Vienna IAEA Press Release in English  
1201 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[IAEA "Press Release—for use of information media, not an official record": "The IAEA Reviews the Safety of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant"—received directly via fax from the IAEA Public Information Service]

[Text] An international expert safety assessment team organized by the IAEA has concluded a visit to the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant to examine the current safety situation. This team carried out its mission during the period 7-17 March 1994.

The review team was composed of 8 safety specialists from Russia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States along with 2 safety experts from the IAEA and one from the Group of 24 Nuclear Safety Coordination Secretariat in Brussels. The review was agreed to by the Ukrainian authorities after the Ukraine Government's October 1993 decision to postpone closure of the Chernobyl station which had been scheduled for the end of 1993. Unit 1 which was placed into operation last week after a three week maintenance

outage is currently operating at 80 percent of its design power level of 1000 MW and Unit 3 at its design level of 1000 MW.

The team examined the plant safety design and a number of specific operational aspects. The review found numerous safety deficiencies in the two units of the plant which remain operational. Of particular concern are specific problems in the design of the first generation Unit 1, which have not been dealt with sufficiently.

In addition the experts identified a number of factors which together affect overall safe plant operation. Difficult working conditions and a serious continuing loss of highly skilled personnel are major problems. Limited procurement of up-to-date equipment also has a negative effect on safety.

A major problem is the technically confirmed accelerated deterioration of the shelter enclosing the destroyed unit 4 reactor which, if it collapses, would have serious consequences. These findings were discussed at the end of the review in Kiev by the IAEA's Assistant Director General for nuclear safety, M. Rosen, with the President of the nuclear power operating organization (GCA), M.P. Umanetz.

The IAEA Director General, Dr. Hans Blix, has communicated on 21 March to the President of Ukraine the conclusion that international levels of safety are not being met at Chernobyl at present. Considering the seriousness of the situation he has suggested that the Ukraine convene a meeting of interested countries parties to consider what actions could be taken to alleviate the situation; the IAEA would be ready to assist the Ukraine in arranging such a meeting in Vienna if so requested.

The President of Ukraine, Mr. Leonid Kravchuk, responded favourably to these suggestions in a reply dated 30 March 1994. Expressing thanks to the expert group for their work, he emphasized that the results of this work were considered by the Ukrainian Government to be a significant input to the objective evaluation of the safety level of the Chernobyl nuclear plant. It is anticipated that a meeting will accordingly be convened in Vienna in the second half of April.

#### **'Highly Critical' Statement Issued**

PM0504135294 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET  
in Swedish 2 Apr 94 p 4

[TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA/SVENSKA  
DAGBLADET report: "Chernobyl Reactors Highly  
Dangerous"]

[Text] New York/Moscow—The International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, views with great concern the risk of a new catastrophe at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in Ukraine.

"The two reactors still in operation are highly dangerous," said IAEA head Hans Blix in an interview with TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA.

The reactors should really have been shut down by now, but last fall Ukraine reversed this decision. The reason given was that the country could not afford to do without them.

A group of inspectors from the IAEA, a UN agency, visited Chernobyl a few weeks ago, and on Thursday [30 March] IAEA headquarters issued a statement highly critical of the power station. The group found that there was much to be criticized at the nuclear power station.

"During the inspection several several shortfalls in the field of safety were discovered at the two units still in operation at the power station," the announcement states.

"Trained personnel have left and there is no money for spare parts," Blix said.

"I have recently informed Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk that the Chernobyl reactors are completely unsatisfactory from the safety viewpoint," he added.

Hans Blix has also offered to arrange a meeting in Vienna to discuss with Ukraine how the safety crisis at Chernobyl can be resolved. According to Thursday's statement from the IAEA in Vienna President Kravchuk has responded positively to the offer.

A 70-page report on the visit to Chernobyl by the group of inspectors is being put together, but an IAEA spokesman said that it is still too early to be able to say whether the inspectors' conclusion will be that Chernobyl should be shut down completely.

The IAEA's negative criticism of safety at Chernobyl was received with mixed feelings in Ukraine, SVENSKA DAGBLADET's Moscow correspondent reports.

"If there were any real danger we would be ordered to shut the installation down. I view this simply as a call that we continue to improve our work in the field of safety," said Mikhail Umanets, the man chiefly responsible for Ukraine's nuclear power industry.

But there were other voices which agreed completely with the IAEA's criticism. Valentin Kupnyy, who is responsible for the safety zone around the installation, said that "the quicker the installation is shut down, the better it will be for Ukraine and the country's neighbors."

Valentin Kupnyy also said that those who today support the continued exploitation of Chernobyl are more interested in the enormous amounts of money which have already been invested than in safety improvements.

"The IAEA did nothing more than note the facts and this is something we have to accept, whether we like it or not," Kupnyy said.



There are plans to reopen next year the third reactor, which was damaged by fire in 1991. However, the authorities have still not reached a decision on a new vault around the fourth reactor which caused the 1986 catastrophe.

"I have received information that the protective covering that exists today has already begun to crack. We are sitting on a time bomb and a frightful catastrophe could occur," Yuriy Bagrov, the president of the fund to help

the victims of Chernobyl, told SVENSKA DAGBLADET during a visit to Kiev a little over a month ago.

It was the economic crisis in Ukraine which prompted the authorities—despite international protests—to reopen Chernobyl. Ukraine had suddenly been forced to pay world market prices for gas and oil from Russia—something for which there was not the money. Nuclear power provides 40 percent of Ukraine's electricity supplies and in order to reduce dependence on Russia Ukraine is intending to bring another three new reactors into service over the next 18 months.

## FRANCE

### Inquiries Into Nuclear Submarine Accident Launched

BR3103144194 Paris LIBERATION in French  
31 Mar 94 p 32

[Report signed Dominique Garaud: "Death on Board Nuclear Submarine 'Emeraude'"]

[Text] French nuclear-powered attack submarines [SNA's] really have been dogged by bad luck. Until now, however, the SNA accidents have not had fatal consequences. Yesterday morning, at 1045 [0845 GMT], 10 submariners were in the SNA Emeraude's turbo alternator compartment. According to Rear Admiral Philippe Roy of the Naval Chiefs-of-Staff, the reasons are still not clear: "A leak occurred. The immediate reaction was the isolation of the cooling circuits. Steam poured into the compartment and the 10 seamen were killed by asphyxiation or burns." The explosion of one of the two condensers projected steam at 250 degrees and 45 bars of pressure, and would have resulted in instant death.

According to initial data released, the explosion caused no damage to the vessel's structure and the disaster was restricted to the compartment protected by two airlocks. The Defense Ministry stated: "This accident in no way calls into question the nuclear safety of the vessel." The 48-megawatt nuclear reactor located next to the compartment is itself contained in a sealed-off area. When the accident occurred, it shut down automatically and was cooled by its own primary circuit. Unlike missile-launching submarines [SNLE's], SNA's are equipped with only conventional weaponry.

According to Rear Admiral Roy, the 10 submariners killed "were from all categories of personnel." The victims included two officers. While normally the turbo alternator compartment is only subject to routine inspection, yesterday the Emeraude's crew was carrying out a "section inspection" which is done at six-monthly intervals on all naval vessels in the presence of the captain or his second-in-command. According to a source cited by AFP, the Emeraude's captain was among the victims, although no conscripts were killed.

The Emeraude has a crew of 66, including eight officers and two conscripts. Like all submarines, it has two crews, termed "red" and "blue," alternating for periods of six weeks at a time. Together with the SNLE's, part of the nuclear deterrent force, the mission of the SNA's is to sweep the seas and oceans to flush out intruders and, using highly-sophisticated equipment, to monitor the activities of other vessels.

The incident took place during an exercise with surface vessels (Casex, in NATO jargon), 50 nautical miles off Toulon in the south of Corsica. Diving when the explosion occurred, the Emeraude managed to make it back up to the surface. The bodies of the victims were winched off by helicopter to one of the accompanying

frigates and then flown back in a helicopter to Toulon. The Emeraude returned to Toulon yesterday evening at low speed (four to five knots, instead of the normal 25 knots), propelled by a backup electric engine.

A legal inquiry and a Naval Command inquest have been opened. At the same time, the Navy has decided to inspect the other five SNA's currently in service. Three of these are out on missions, two in the Mediterranean and one in the Atlantic. They have been recalled to Toulon.

The Navy is already denying any comparison with the accidents on the SNA's Rubin in August 1993 and Amethyst last March. In both cases, these incidents were collisions that could probably be put down to navigational errors and which have already resulted in reprimands. In the case of the Emeraude, it will be necessary to essentially determine the cause of the problem, unprecedented on this type of vessel which has been in service with the Navy for six years.

Defense Minister Francois Leotard visited Toulon yesterday, accompanied by the head of the Naval Chiefs-of-Staff, Alain Coaranea. He restated that "there is no nuclear risk." Stressing that the French people had to be informed of the "responsibilities and the technical causes" of the accident, he indicated that the conclusions of the inquiries will be made public.

#### Technical Specifications of SNA Emeraude

Length	72.1 meters
Diameter	7.6 meters
Speed	Over 25 knots (46 km/h)
Surface displacement (weight)	2,385 tonnes
Depth	Over 300 meters
Crew	66 men, including eight officers
Weapons tubes	Four
Armament capacity	14 T-533 torpedoes or SM-39 missiles (conventional weapons)
Autonomous operation	60 days

#### Expected Drop in Arms Exports Due to 'Diplomatic Choices'

BR0604135694 Paris LA TRIBUNE DESFOSSES  
in French 5 Apr 94 p 9

[Olivier Provost report: "Arms Exports: Substantial Drop Likely in 1994"]

[Text] French weapons exports totaled 45 billion French francs [Fr] in 1993, a figure close to the 1992 record. This year, however, the government fears that such exports may fall to Fr30 billion.

The official figure for French weapons exports in 1993 has not been disclosed yet. Reliable sources estimate it to be "approximately Fr45 billion." In 1992, Fr50 billion worth of French weapons were sold abroad, the best

performance since 1984. Last year's figure includes the Fr21 billion in revenues from the sale of 390 Leclerc tanks (Giat Industries) and 46 tow trucks to the United Arab Emirates in February. Another Fr2.8 billion came from the sale of 17 Cougar helicopters to the Netherlands and another 20 to Turkey (Cougars are made by Eurocopter, which is owned by Aerospatiale (70 percent) and DASA [Deutsche Aerospace] (30 percent)). A number of smaller contracts made up the balance.

#### Due to a Number of Diplomatic Choices...

However, the government takes small comfort in this relatively satisfactory performance, as it believes the current year may turn out to be a very disappointing one. According to an expert, the initial hope of seeing French sales reach the Fr60-billion mark by year end has now been superseded by a more pessimistic forecast: that of a final figure hovering around an abysmal Fr30 billion. This is due to a number of diplomatic choices, such as the defense agreement entered into with Israel in the midst of the international talks on Palestinian occupied territories, which is said to have infuriated Arab countries. Another such choice is Paris' decision to turn its back to Taiwan in the hope of regaining China's favors.

To this must be added some rumored commercial blunders on the part of France, among others the underestimation of competition and weak financial arrangements.

On 17 November 1993, French Defense Minister Francois Leotard stated the following in an interview with LA TRIBUNE DESFOSSES: "I think we should exceed 1992's figure of Fr50 billion in 1994 and possibly even in 1995." In early January, Mr. Leotard's ministry still saw things in this light. Today, such rather overoptimistic hopes have been deflated. In Sweden, the Leclerc tank has lost out to Germany's Leopard (Krauss Maffei) in a bid for 120 units worth Fr4.3 billion.

Matra's Mica missile is in danger of being sidelined by the American Amraam missile and British Aerospace's Activ Skyflash in the race to provide Stockholm with 500 airborne missile worth Fr2.8 billion. In Pakistan, as part of a competition for three submarines worth Fr3.5 billion, Sweden's Kockums corporation is proving a dangerous competitor for France's shipbuilding industry. Abu Dhabi still has not bought the 10 or so Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircraft Dassault thought it would, and Pakistan has bought no additional aircraft either. Saudi Arabia may well postpone until 1995 payment of all or part of the Fr9 billion relating to the three large maintenance contracts it recently entered into with France; and it has not yet decided to purchase the three French anti-aircraft frigates worth Fr20 billion.

Last, Taiwan is now keeping its distance [following the rapprochement with the PRC], although the island was expected to purchase weapon systems worth Fr10 billion for its six French-made frigates, as well as 300 armored vehicles made by Renault Vehicules Industriels (Fr1.2 billion), and Fr2.5 billion's worth of Roland missiles (jointly made by Aerospatiale and DASA), not to mention another 60 Mirage aircraft in a more distant future.



## UN Security Council Statement on DPRK Inspections

### Text of UNSC Draft

SK2703015294 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
27 Mar 94 p 5

[Text] United Nations—Following is the text of a proposed Security Council resolution calling on North Korea to permit completion of an inspection by a team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify there has been no diversion of nuclear materials.

IAEA inspectors were in North Korea from March 3 to 14 but the agency says they were not allowed to carry out all required activities.

The resolution, still subject to amendment, is expected to be voted on some time next week.

The Security Council,

—Recalling its resolution 825 (1993), and the statement made by the President of the Council on 9 April 1993,

—Reaffirming the critical importance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the implementation of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty) and the contribution which progress in nonproliferation makes to the maintenance of international peace and security,

—Endorsing and commending the efforts of the Director-General of the IAEA and the IAEA Secretariat to implement the IAEA-Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403),

—Recalling the expressed willingness of the DPRK to seek a proper settlement of the nuclear safeguards issue in the DPRK within the framework of resolution 825 (1993),

—Reaffirming the importance of the Joint Declaration by the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and of the parties to that declaration addressing the nuclear issue in their continuing dialogue,

—Having considered with grave concern the IAEA Board of Governors' findings contained in its resolution of 21 March 1994 that the DPRK is in further non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, and has aggravated this situation by not allowing IAEA inspectors, as agreed between the IAEA and DPRK on 15 February 1994, to conduct indispensable inspection activities at their seven declared nuclear sites,

—Deploing the fact that the IAEA is, therefore, still unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the terms of the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

1. Urges the DPRK to allow the IAEA inspectors to complete the inspection activities agreed between the IAEA and the DPRK on Feb. 15 1994, as the first step in fulfilling its obligations under the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement and in honoring its nonproliferation obligations under the Treaty;

2. Requests the director-general of the IAEA to report to the Security Council within one month of the adoption of the present resolution on the implementation of the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement;

3. Requests the DPRK and ROK to renew discussions whose purpose is implementation of the Joint Declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula;

4. Requests further that those member states engaged in dialogue with the DPRK to facilitate a solution in accordance with resolution 825 (1993) continue that dialogue, after the IAEA completes all inspections at their seven declared nuclear sites necessary to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material since earlier inspections;

5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and to consider further Security Council action if necessary.

### UNSC Circulates Draft Resolution

SK2603055094 Seoul YONHAP in English 0517 GMT  
26 Mar 94

[Text] United Nations, March 25 (YONHAP)—The U.N. Security Council on Friday circulated among its 15 member countries a draft resolution asking the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to report back to the council on whether North Korea has fulfilled its nuclear safeguards obligations within one month of the resolution's adoption.

The U.S.-drafted resolution indirectly warns that unless North Korea accepts further IAEA inspections within a month of its adoption, the Security Council will take additional action.

The draft was circulated at a closed-door session held Friday afternoon local time.

In addition, the draft resolution states that the Security Council will continue to handle the North Korean nuclear question and will, if necessary, consider further action.

A source here said that most Security Council members, including such permanent members as the United Kingdom, France and Russia, support the draft. China and Pakistan are opposed, he said.

Earlier in the day, China, through individual contacts with other member countries, advocated adopting a statement by the council president instead of a resolution.

At the afternoon session, however, China stressed that the manifestation of the council's posture should be affirmative, objective and moderate in content, according to British Ambassador David Hannay.

Chinese Deputy Ambassador Chen Jian left halfway through the meeting and told reporters that the nuclear issue is very sensitive and should be resolved through continued negotiations among the parties involved.

Ambassador Hannay said a broad consensus had been reached on the draft resolution among council members. He foresaw few problems in its passage.

Russian Ambassador Yuriy Boronchev expressed support for the draft resolution, saying that it contained the minimum necessary items.

The resolution will likely be put to a vote toward the end of this month, Ambassador Hannay said.

The Security Council will meet behind closed doors again on March 28 to continue discussing the draft.

#### Statement Calls on DPRK To 'Cooperate'

OW0104041894 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0355 GMT 1 Apr 94

[Text] United Nations, March 31 (XINHUA)—The UN Security Council issued a presidential statement today, calling on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to cooperate in the international inspection of its nuclear sites.

The council urged DPRK to allow IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors to complete the inspection activities agreed by the two sides last month.

IAEA reported to the council earlier this month that because of DPRK's objection, it was unable to draw conclusions as to whether there has been either diversion of nuclear material or reprocessing or other operations.

But DPRK argued that the inspections required by IAEA were beyond the line agreed upon by the two sides last month.

The council also appealed to those member states engaged in dialogue with DPRK to continue their dialogue in accordance with the agreement.

The United States, Britain and France at first insisted on using warning languages in either a resolution or a statement but met strong opposition from China, which said that anything done by the council should be mild and constructive and that any pressure against DPRK would be counterproductive.

China's position got support from the 10 non-permanent member countries, which argued that since China was a next-door neighbor of DPRK, its observations should be respected.

After several days of heated debate, the council at last reached consensus on the statement which contained most of China's suggestions.

#### Seoul Radio Reports Statement

SK0104020794 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
0100 GMT 1 Apr 94

[Text] After four rounds of official and unofficial discussions, the UN Security Council [UNSC] adopted and announced today a presidential statement urging North Korea to comply with the obligations of the nuclear safeguard accord. The following is a report by correspondent Nam Son-hyon from UN headquarters.

[Begin Nam recording] The UNSC held a plenary meeting on the morning of 1 April Korean time and unanimously adopted a presidential statement urging North Korea to accept nuclear inspections. Saying that the statement was adopted upon agreement of all the UNSC member states, Jean-Bernard Merimee, president of the UNSC, read the statement in which indirect expressions replaced precise wordings of additional measures on North Korea and a negotiation deadline.

In the presidential statement adopted today, the clause regarding additional measures on North Korea was mildly expressed by stating that additional evaluation will be made on the compliance of the agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] if North Korea refuses nuclear inspections.

As to the negotiation deadline, which was one month, no specific date was fixed, but the IAEA secretary-general is to report the result of negotiations with North Korea to the UNSC at the next inspection. The presidential statement comprises five articles including that the UNSC will continue to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue and urge North-South dialogue.

Today's statement was a presidential statement, which is milder than a binding resolution, without any strong expression including sanctions or measures on North Korea. It is analyzed that China had strong influence on the statement and the United States, United Kingdom, and France made considerable concessions.

However, a high-ranking official of the ROK mission to the United Nations, said that the United States explained the draft statement to the ROK in advance and evaluated that it is more meaningful to adopt a presidential statement with the participation of China and have China actively involved in the North Korean nuclear issue in the future than to adopt a resolution and exclude a few countries from measures on North Korea. [end Nam recording]

#### DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Comment

SK0304234594 Pyongyang Korean Central  
Broadcasting Network in Korean 2115 GMT 3 Apr 94

[Statement by DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman issued in Pyongyang on 4 April—read by announcer]

[Text] A spokesman for the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs released the following statement regarding the UN Security Council's [UNSC] announcement of the president's statement making irrational demands [tangchi anun yogudul] on us:

On 31 March, the UNSC announced the president's statement making irrational demands while urging us to allow additional unjust [pudanghan] inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

The nature of our nuclear issue is not one to be referred to the UNSC for discussions. We have already allowed enough inspections of our nuclear facilities to guarantee the continuity of safeguards, as we agreed with the United States and the IAEA. There is no room for any doubt here.

Even if there had been some differences in opinion in the course of the inspection, that should be settled between the agency and the inspected country, the actual parties concerned with the inspection.

Why on earth, despite these facts, did the UNSC finally discuss the referred issue on inspections of us and adopt the president's statement?

The intrinsic nature of the problem is clear. The United States needed the UNSC, a stage for political discussions [chongchijok toui madang], and had to make the president's statement, a venue for pressure [amnyok konggan] to realize the hostile policy to crush [apsal] the DPRK.

The UNSC, whose mission is to guarantee peace and security of the world, discussed our issue based the IAEA Board of Governors' unjust and biased conclusion [pudanghago pyonggyonjogin kyollon] noting that the scope of the noncompliance with the safeguards accord has been broadened [tambo hyopchong pulihaengui pomwiga hwaktae toeoddanun]. This clearly contracts the purpose and principle of the UN Charter.

Today's reality is that the United States and some Western forces [ilbu sobang seryoktul], who see our socialist system as a thorn in their flesh, can have international organizations at their beck and call [che maumdaero chwauji halsu innun], if necessary, to plot to harm small countries, such as our country. No one can deny this.

If the UNSC indeed wants to fulfill its mission, it should raise an issue [munjesi] with the United States, which is posing grave threats to peace and security on the Korean peninsula with an immense number of nuclear weapons while creating obstacles to the solution of the nuclear problem, and the South Korean authorities, the perpetrator [hasuin] of the United States.

What cannot be overlooked, in addition, is that the UNSC has unjustly raised an outcry over us, who are conducting peaceful nuclear activities [pyonghwajok haek hwalton], while ignoring those countries that are playing the dangerous nuclear game [wihoman haek changnanjil] under the U.S. protection. This shows that,

applying a double standard, the UNSC is being used by the United States for realizing its hostile policy to crush the DPRK.

The UNSC intentionally ignored the nature of our nuclear issue and raised an issue regarding the implementation of the safeguards accord in the president's statement encouraged by [pyongsung] the U.S. hostile policy against the DPRK.

The validity of the safeguards accord has virtually been suspended since we temporarily suspended the effectuation of the withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] for the DPRK-U.S. talks. Up to the present, we have allowed inspections only to guarantee the continuity of safeguards as a self-imposed and well-meant measure [chayulchogin sonuiui chochiroso] with the desire to prove the transparency of our nuclear activities. These inspections coincide with our special Position [uriga chohae innun tuksu chiwie puhaptoennun].

Since the United States and the IAEA could not deny this, they agreed to conduct the restricted inspection only to guarantee the continuity of safeguards, not regular or irregular inspections [chonggi mit pijonggi]. Accordingly, raising an issue on the implementation of the safeguards accord and additional inspections is senseless to us since we are in an authorized special position [kongindoen tuksu chiwi].

We do what we say we are going to do, and do not do what we say we are not going to do. We are invariably adhering to a firm independent policy and a correct line on external relations. We have never changed a position that we once declared.

The UNSC should first take steps to fix the unjust action by the IAEA Secretariat, which has widened the area of unjust treatment of us [urie taehan pulgongjongsongui pomwirul hwaktaesikigo innun], currying favor with large countries, before demanding our additional inspections.

The IAEA Secretariat ought to apologize for the fact that it has widened the area of unjust treatment, openly joining the U.S. anti- Republic maneuver. Far from apologizing, the IAEA Secretariat has gradually expanded its unjust treatment of us. We will repay [kyesan] this without fail.

The United States is more openly stirring up the maneuver of international pressure against the Republic [kukchejogin pangonghwaguk amnyok sodongul touk nogolhwa hago itta], using the IAEA Board of Governors and the UNSC.

Furthermore, the United States is carrying into extremes its military pressure, saying that it will resume the Team Spirit joint military exercise and that it is ready to trigger the second Korean war [cheiui choson chonjaengdo pulsahagetta].



All facts clearly prove that the United States has no intention to resolve the nuclear issue at all and that its main aim is to realize its hostile policy of crushing Korea [taechoson choktaesi apsal chongchaek] by deliberately aggravating the situation of the Korean peninsula.

Complying with this as well, by continuing to introduce nuclear weapons and stepping up their nuclear development, the South Korean authorities are attempting to persistently stage a nuclear war exercise against us in conspiracy with a nuclear possession country. This shows that the South Korean authorities are, in fact, not interested in the joint declaration of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula but are rushing toward the criminal road of nullifying it.

Under the present situation in which the United States is clinging to pressure alone [migugi amyok ilbyondoro naonun hyon sanghwangeso] after overturning all promises made to us we have no choice but to conduct on a normal basis our peaceful nuclear activities [chong-sanghwa hajiannulsu opke toeyotta] which we had unilaterally frozen for the DPRK-U.S. talks.

The United States and the South Korean authorities are attempting to escalate their commotion of pressure on us with the presidential statement of the UN Security Council as an occasion. However, this cannot fool us.

The more the United States and its follower forces scheme to crush the socialist system of our own style, the firmer the singleheartedly united might of our party, the people, and the People's Army will be.

Responding to force with force and to dialogue with dialogue is our firm and invariable will and policy. The U.S. hostile policy of crushing Korea will not escape ruin.

Our position to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully is consistent [sijong ilgwan hada].

[Dated] 4 April 1994, Pyongyang.

#### PRC's Qian Lauds Statement

OW0304020994 Tokyo KYODO in English 0147 GMT  
3 Apr 94

[Text] Beijing, April 3 KYODO—Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on Saturday [2 April] lauded a mildly worded UN Security Council statement on the North Korean nuclear standoff, saying it helped to ease tension on the Korean peninsula.

"The adoption of a presidential statement focusing on dialogue has helped to ease tension and gives the countries and organizations concerned some time leeway," Qian told a delegation of Japan's Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP is the largest group in Japan's seven-party coalition.

After one week of diplomatic bargaining with China, which firmly opposed the adoption of any resolution against its longtime ally North Korea, the 15-member

Security Council on Thursday issued a nonbinding presidential statement urging Pyongyang to allow the completion of international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

The statement did not include a threat of sanctions should North Korea continue to refuse the inspections, but said "further Security Council consideration will take place if necessary in order to achieve full implementation" of nuclear safeguards Pyongyang signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Noting that the statement has nonbinding character, Qian said, however, he hopes "that it can be avoided that such a situation occurs."

He suggested that the IAEA explain to Pyongyang why inspections carried out over two weeks in March are considered inadequate to decide whether Pyongyang has diverted nuclear material for weapon purposes.

Pyongyang, while maintaining that its nuclear program serves strictly civilian purposes, contends it fully complied with the IAEA inspection demands.

The SDP delegation headed by Issei Inoue arrived on Friday for talks with Chinese leaders and representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

In a meeting with Li Shuzheng, head of the International Liaison Department of the party's Central Committee, on Friday both sides agreed to dispatch another SDP delegation to China in mid-May to mark the 10th anniversary of relations between their parties, SDP officials said.

#### PRC Delegation To Explain Position to DPRK

SK0404012994 Seoul YONHAP in English 0116 GMT  
4 Apr 94

[Text] Seoul, April 4 (YONHAP)—China plans to send a high-level delegation to North Korea for the 82nd birthday of President Kim Il-sung on April 15 that will urge resolution of the nuclear dispute through dialogue, a Seoul government official said Sunday.

The Chinese delegates will reportedly brief Pyongyang on the recent summit between South Korean and Chinese Presidents Kim Yong-sam and Jiang Zemin and explain Beijing's position in approving a United Nations Security Council statement calling on the Stalinist country to meet with the United States and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

They are to highlight Kim Yong-sam's assurances that South Korea has neither the intention nor ability to absorb the North and will support Pyongyang vis-a-vis the United States and Japan when the nuclear problem is resolved, as well as emphasizing the need for inter-Korean dialogue.

Beijing promised efforts, albeit limited, to lure Pyongyang to the negotiating table during Kim's visit to China last week.

The Chinese delegation to Pyongyang is likely to be led by a senior official who will congratulate Kim Il-song on his 82nd birthday, the Seoul official said.

The visiting delegates are expected to advocate peaceful resolution of the nuclear problem in meetings with high-level North Korean officials, he said. The Chinese will pay a courtesy call on President Kim Il-song and explain South Korean President Kim's thoughts on North Korea set forth in his summit with Jiang, the official said.

North Korea and the United States will resume contact in one way or another, the official said, probably later in the month after Kim's birthday.

#### **Spokesman Denies Beijing To Send Delegation**

*HK0504131494 Hong Kong AFP in English 1258 GMT  
5 April 94*

[Text] Beijing, April 5 (AFP)—China denied Tuesday [5 April] it was sending a high-level delegation to North Korea to mark the 82nd birthday of Kim Il-Sung on April 15.

"We have never heard something like China sending a high-level delegation to North Korea to attend President Kim's birthday celebrations," said a foreign ministry spokesman contacted by telephone.

He was denying a report by South Korea's YONHAP news agency which said that members of the delegation would have talks with Kim about the nuclear standoff following Pyongyang's refusal to allow full International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its nuclear sites.

On Monday North Korea officially rejected an appeal by the United Nations Security Council to open its sites to IAEA inspectors.

China is the North's closest ally and so far has refused to put any pressure on Pyongyang over the nuclear affair or to support moves to impose international sanctions.

#### **Russia To Support Resolution**

*SK2903021094 Seoul YONHAP in English 0121 GMT  
29 Mar 94*

[Text] Seoul, March 29 (YONHAP)—Russia would support a United Nations Security Council resolution calling on North Korea to accept nuclear inspections, while seeking an international meeting to discuss the issue attended by South and North Korea, the United States, Japan, Russia, China, the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Radio Moscow reported Monday.

According to NAEWOE PRESS, Seoul's official monitor of communist countries' news media, the radio said,

"Moscow would support a UN Security Council resolution calling for North Korea to observe its obligations to the IAEA under the framework of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty."

Moreover, Russia thinks that neighboring countries' efforts to solve the problem are not enough so it will try to hold an international meeting of delegates from South and North Korea, Japan, Russia, China, the United States, the UN secretary-general and the IAEA director-general, the radio said.

Radio Moscow, citing the scheduled deployment of Patriot missiles in South Korea and Pyongyang's objections to the move, said, "the tension on the Korean peninsula is worsening and under these circumstances, Russia's idea on holding an international meeting is useful and pressing."

#### **Saito Gives 'Tacit' Support**

*OW2803122994 Tokyo KYODO in English 1159 GMT  
28 Mar 94*

[Text] Tokyo, March 28 KYODO—Japan voiced tacit support Monday [29 March] for China's proposal for a soft nonbinding statement at the U.N. Security Council urging North Korea to accept full nuclear inspections.

Vice Foreign Minister Kunihiro Saito told a news conference, "not a single country believes it's appropriate to take measures that could escalate things rapidly to a high stage (of urgency)."

Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States last week conferred privately over a draft resolution.

The U.S. has proposed a resolution urging North Korea to agree to follow-up inspections of its nuclear facilities within one month. The resolution does not call for sanctions but leaves room for "further action if necessary."

China, which is eager to keep open the door for dialogue with North Korea, says it is too early for such a step.

China suggested Friday that the Security Council issue a nonbinding statement in the name of its president, Jean-Bernard Merimee of France, which unlike a resolution could be adopted by consensus rather than by vote.

Saito said Tokyo expects the 15-member Security Council to take measures "most suitable at this point, as many members have the same awareness of the problem as we do."

Noting that "the aim is to make North Korea change its policy and not to take punitive action," Saito said Tokyo does not "object" to the dialogue approach.

As a permanent member China holds the power of veto, which it is likely to use if the council calls for tougher action such as economic sanctions against its longtime ally North Korea.

South Korea's Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu said Sunday before adopting resolutions China's proposal "may be effective."

Concerning direct talks between Japan and North Korea, Saito said Tokyo would positively respond if Pyongyang signaled interest in such talks, which "it does not seem to have."

### Tokyo Backs UNSC Stand

OW0104032394 Tokyo KYODO in English 0258 GMT  
1 Apr 94

[Text] Tokyo, April 1 KYODO—Japan on Friday [1 April] supported a United Nations call on North Korea to allow full international inspection of its nuclear facilities suspected of being used to develop nuclear weapons.

"The UN statement underlined what the international community wants North Korea to do to help resolve the issue of Pyongyang's suspected nuclear program through dialogue," Chief Cabinet Secretary Masayoshi Takemura told a news conference.

"We will support this statement," the top government spokesman said.

All 15 members of the UN Security Council, including China, a traditional ally of North Korea, agreed to issue the statement Thursday calling for Pyongyang to accept full inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

### ROK's Han Comments

SK0304044094 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean  
3 Apr 94 p 2

[Report by Washington correspondent Chong Chin-sok]

[Text] ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu said on 1 April, Washington time, that the UN Security Council's adoption of the president's statement raised the possibility of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue. Minister Han said this at a news conference he gave to ROK correspondents at the National Press Club in Washington after holding talks with U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry. He also said: "We attach more significance to the measures—which may be taken by the UN Security Council—than to dialogue." He added: "The government has no plan for now to propose a diplomatic initiative to Pyongyang."

The following are questions posed and the answers:

**Question:** What has happened to the ROK-U.S. coordination of views on the Team Spirit exercise?

**Han Sung-chu:** North Korea has not fulfilled its agreement with the United States. This has created circumstances under which we can cancel our plan to withhold the exercise. However, a final decision will be announced after consultations between the ROK and the United

States which will be held when U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry visits the ROK.

**Question:** The signing of the contract to purchase Patriot missiles is reportedly imminent. Can you comment?

**Han:** That is absolutely not true. We did not buy those Patriot missiles to be deployed in the ROK. The United States deploys them because the U.S. Forces in the ROK need them.

**Question:** What do you think of Secretary Perry's strong remarks toward North Korea?

**Han:** He said portions of his full remarks were reported after being exaggerated. He also said he stressed a need to maintain a deterrent or defensive capability depending on the future situation.

**Question:** Did President Kim Yong-sam not give you the mission of having a resolution passed at the UN Security Council?

**Han:** UN Security Council discussions are multilateral. Therefore, no country can have its hope fulfilled 100 percent. Our country had tried to have a resolution passed at the UN Security Council. However, one must not overlook the fact that the recently-passed statement of the Security Council president contains more substantial details.

**Question:** Do you have any hidden card for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue?

**Han:** The North Korean nuclear issue is complex and has no special remedy. Therefore, I would like to highly assess the Security Council president's statement because the statement has made it possible to start discussions on the nuclear issue again.

**Question:** Is the troop reinforcement, which Secretary Perry has referred to, an irrevocable, final decision?

**Han:** I do not think so.

**Question:** How will our diplomacy be carried out for a few weeks from now?

**Han:** First of all, I think, China will make efforts to make North Korea correctly realize the message contained in the president's statement, and the contact between the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and North Korea will possibly resume. I believe that if nuclear inspections are completed in this course, the possibility of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue will arise.

**Question:** When do you think North Korea will receive further inspections?

**Han:** We think there is a deadline in actuality even though one was not mentioned in the statement. The fact that the IAEA believes that inspections must resume in six weeks is a good point for consideration.



### **ROK Press Criticizes Han**

SK2903094494

[Editorial Report] ROK vernacular newspapers on 29 March carry editorials and articles on ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu's "hasty" support for the PRC proposal that the UN Security Council president issue a statement on the North Korean nuclear issue instead of a resolution.

The moderate CHOSON ILBO publishes on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "Diplomatic Authorities Should Watch Their Words." While positively recognizing the significance of China's new proposal, the editorial says it is "strategically and technically" inappropriate for ROK diplomats to say "yes" so promptly.

The editorial questions if Minister Han had sufficient discussion with security-related ministers regarding this issue, and even if he had, the editorial says before conveying acceptance, the ROK should have persistently asked China what it will do when sanctions on North Korea become inevitable even after a UN Security Council president's statement.

The editorial also mentions the possibility of having China accept more of ROK's position on economic cooperation since the ROK accepted China's opinion on the nuclear issue.

The moderate HANGUK ILBO publishes on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "Even Though A Cooperation System on the North Korean Nuclear Issue Is Established." The editorial criticizes that "China is using the North Korean nuclear issue to obtain better conditions in its negotiations on human rights and most-favored-nation status with the United States, and economic cooperation with the ROK."

Noting that the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Russia have exerted their own efforts to resolve the nuclear issue, the editorial defines Minister Han's support without consultation with allies as a "hasty" decision.

The editorial further stresses that if a statement is to be adopted, it should strongly urge North Korea to accept additional inspection, resume North-South dialogue, and provide a fixed deadline.

HANGUK ILBO also publishes on page 5 a 1,000-word article dispatched from UN headquarters by correspondent Kim Su-chong. The article observes that 15 member states of the UN Security Council are inclined to agree to China's proposal and that the United States would have no reason to insist on a resolution when the ROK supports the new proposal.

The article then details the points to which China disagreed from the draft resolution and its proposal of "a positive, objective, and moderate expression."

The article reports that interests will be focused on China's role after the statement is adopted. Recalling that China said it was not in a position to exercise

influence on North Korea last year, the article analyzes that China has changed its attitude by telling the ROK permanent representative to the United Nations that "China is exerting its efforts needed in the situation."

### **ROK 28 March Press Examines PRC Proposal**

SK2803091694

[Editorial Report] Seoul vernacular newspapers on 28 March carry articles and editorials on China's new proposal for a solution to the DPRK nuclear issue.

The moderate TONG-A ILBO publishes on page 3 a 1,800-word article by correspondent Kim Cha-un from UN Headquarters under the headline, "The Significance of the Alternative Plan on the 'Statement in the Name of the President of the UN Security Council.'"

Noting that with the "new alternative plan" proposed by China on 25 March regarding the UN Security Council moves for adoption of a resolution on North Korea, discussion of the North Korean nuclear issue at the council has entered "a new phase," the article predicts that this proposal will bring about "a temporary stumbling block" in the West's plan to cope with North Korea in the future, and shows doubt as to whether North Korea will "obediently follow" the statement of the president of the UN Security Council which has no "binding force," unlike the resolution. The article also points out a possibility that this plan may "spoil" the atmosphere of the international community's "hardline measures" against the North Korean nuclear issue by giving North Korea time to drag on the issue. In spite of this, the article notes the recent Chinese proposal is winning "more affirmative reaction" by the West, and illustrates the reason for this as follows: First, with this proposal, one can sense that China's basic position on the North Korean nuclear issue is "changing" and that China agrees with the UN Security Council's "interference in and action" for the North Korean nuclear issue. Second, the West is hoping that such a change in China's attitude will exercise "a decisive influence" on North Korea, because China's support for a statement by the president of the UN Security Council means that China raises the "same voice" with the United States and other Western countries "opposing" North Korean nuclear development. Third, Western diplomats believe that China's "joining" in the efforts of the security council for a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue is "more important" than anything else. Thus, it is highly likely that the West will "accept" the Chinese proposal for adopting the statement of the council president during negotiations with the Chinese side next week. The article predicts, however, that the two sides will have a "tug of war" over the "contents" to be included in the statement.

The TONG-A ILBO also carries on page 3 a 1,300-word article by reporter Kim Cha-su, entitled "The Government's Position on the 'Alternative Plan Proposed by China.'" The article notes that the government showed

an "affirmative reaction" to the Chinese proposal for adopting a statement to be issued in the name of the UN Security Council president because it believes that "winning support from China" is "more important" than anything else. The government hopes, the article writes, that the "same voice" raised not only by the five permanent committee members of the security council, including China, but also the 10 non-permanent committee members, will work as even "greater pressure" on North Korea.

The article observes that the purpose of the Chinese side in proposing the statement is to give North Korea "room" to accept an "additional inspection" and that by doing this, China will be able to explain to North Korea that if North Korea does not "comply with" the demand of the international community, China can "no longer" stand only on the side of North Korea. The government, however, maintains that the "contents" of the statement proposed by China should not be "remarkably" different from "a draft resolution" pushed by the security council's permanent members including the United States, and that the statement should include a content clarifying that "next-stage steps" will be taken according to the North Korean "attitude," referring to the remarks of the IAEA director-general that if another inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities is not conducted within six weeks, safeguards are highly likely to be "suspended." The article points out that during the ROK-PRC summit in Beijing, the ROK will ask China to support the security council's resolution in return for the ROK's acceptance of the Chinese proposal. ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu will bring the result of his talks with Chinese leaders to the United States and based on this, will discuss "measures" henceforth with the security council's permanent members, including the United States.

The TONG-A ILBO also carries on page 3 a 1,300-word editorial under the headline, "A Pitfall in the Resumption of Dialogue." Pointing to "affirmative" moves of the UN Security Council and the ROK Government concerning the new Chinese proposal, the editorial writes that with emphasis put only on the nuclear issue, the issue regarding "tension" between the North and the South Korea has been "put aside," and denounces North Korea's "persistent refusal" of inter-Korean dialogue and recent remarks on "Seoul becoming a sea of fire." The editorial says that there is a "high possibility" that North Korea's "antinational, menacing act" may be "overlooked" if North Korea expresses "readiness" to accept additional inspection, changing its attitude. But the editorial urges the North to "apologize" for its "abnormal acts" and to basically change its attitude, so that it may be recognized as "a dialogue partner."

The moderate CHUNGANG ILBO publishes on page 3 a 1,200-word editorial under the headline, "How Long Should We Put Up With the Statement of the Security Council's President?" The editorial notes that with China's proposal for a security council president's statement, the North Korean nuclear issue will likely return

to the "condition of one year ago" because the North has not shown any change in its attitude, and expresses "doubt" as to whether the ROK Government's support for the Chinese proposal is "appropriate." Criticizing the government's "excessive appeasement attitude," the editorial stresses that the "stick," while not necessarily meaning "confrontation," is more effective for bringing North Korea to the dialogue table.

#### **ROK 2 April Newspapers Comment on Resolution SK0204084894**

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of editorials carried by ROK vernacular newspapers on 2 April commenting on the UN Security Council's adoption of a president's statement on the North Korean nuclear issue.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "Aftermath of the President's Statement."

The editorial first describes the president's statement as the "first stick," because the statement contains the UN Security Council's "clear will" to demand that North Korea receive nuclear inspections. The editorial adds that North Korea must know it will be a "loser" if it thinks it still has time to "maneuver." The editorial writes: "If North Korea continuously uses its nuclear card, the international community will become more and more wary of North Korea. North Korea must be trustworthy if it wants economic cooperation with the international community. North Korea has given rise to nuclear suspicions and, thus, tarnished its image. This is tantamount to destroying a basis for economic cooperation."

The editorial continues that it is time the government sincerely goes through a reexamination, writing: "It must no longer be lured by optimistic or romantic approaches."

The moderate TONG-A ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled: "Aftermath of the UN Security Council President's Statement."

The editorial first advises that North Korea "will not ignore" the statement on the grounds that the statement is nonbinding. The editorial then asks North Korea to "pay attention to" the UN Security Council recommendation that North-South negotiations be resumed to implement the joint denuclearization declaration.

Referring to the U.S. media report that it is all right even if special envoys are exchanged during or after the DPRK-U.S. talks, the editorial writes that "this idea will only satisfy North Korea, which pursues a policy of thoroughly excluding South Korea from all negotiations." The editorial finally asks the ROK Government

to "maintain consistency" in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, instead of running about in confusion.

The moderate HANGUK ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled: "UN Security Council Statement."

The editorial writes that as a result of the adoption of the statement, the "ball is again in North Korea's court." It says: "It is clear that the UN Security Council will seek the adoption of a resolution on sanctions against North Korea if North Korea does not receive nuclear inspections. Therefore, time will not always be on the North Korean side. Because North Korea's efforts to indefinitely resist the pressure has its limits, it must know that the sooner it decides to receive nuclear inspections and resume North-South dialogue, the more beneficial it will be."

The pro-government SEOUL SINMUN carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled: "It is Time China Persuades North Korea To Receive Nuclear Inspections."

The editorial first expresses its discontent over China's excessive protection of North Korea regarding the nuclear issue and refers to China's responsibility for this issue. It writes: "China preferred the adoption of a statement, a moderate approach, at the UN Security Council, while insisting on dialogue, and our country and the world accepted China's idea. Therefore, complying with the spirit of the statement, China must persuade North Korea to accept the international community's demand before the UN Security Council resumes deliberations and adopts a resolution on sanctions."

The editorial concludes: "North Korea will not be able to go scot-free [musa halsu opta] without ensuring nuclear transparency. It would be wise to accept the UN recommendation and China's persuasion."

The left-leaning HANGYORE SINMUN carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled: "Government's Chaotic 'Solution' to the Nuclear Problem."

The editorial first describes the chaotic situation regarding the North Korean nuclear issue due to the ROK Government's frequent changes in policies. Referring to U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry's remarks that the United States would prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons even if it requires that the United States wages another war on the Korean peninsula, the editorial asks who will pay the price for such a war. Commenting on the government's position that the statement will express the international community's view on the North Korean nuclear issue to North Korea, the editorial asks the ROK Government to solidify its basic policy on the North Korean nuclear issue.

## IAEA Head Blix Does Not Expect Sanctions Against DPRK

AU3103101494 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German  
31 Mar 94

[Interview with IAEA Director General Hans Blix by Gerhard Bitzan; place and date not given: "North Korea Must allow Nuclear Inspections"]

[Text] Bitzan: How strong is the nuclear threat today after the end of the Cold War?

Blix: If I take a look at the international media, I actually have the feeling that the spread of nuclear weapons is the biggest danger in the world, and that there are numerous states in the world that are only waiting to buy or build their own nuclear weapons—without any control. However, one must also see the progress: A number of former risk states, including Brazil or Argentina, but also South Africa, have voluntarily given up their nuclear ambitions. There will be nuclear-free zones in Africa and Latin America, and even in the Middle East, talks on such a zone are under way.

Bitzan: Has the collapse of the Soviet Union not made the proliferation of nuclear weapons uncontrollable?

Blix: It has certainly increased the danger. Ukraine, for example, has not joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Then there is also the risk of the "leakage" of know-how and of nuclear material from the former USSR. Yet so far we have not seen a single case of the illegal export of enriched uranium, which is required for atomic bombs. As far as plutonium is concerned, the quantities were very, very small—grams or milligrams.

An increasing number of developing countries are able to develop nuclear weapons if they use all their funds on this project. Yet the danger that has often been conjured up—that this could happen overnight—does not exist at all.

Bitzan: Do you believe that Saddam Husayn might again build a bomb?

Blix: After many years of work, we reassessed Iraq's nuclear program. We know how the supply worked, where the materials and the know-how came from. We are certain that something like that will not happen again as long as the control continues.

Bitzan: What were the reasons for the differences between the IAEA and North Korea?

Blix: During inspections and analyses, we discovered, as early as in 1992, that more plutonium existed than was declared. Only a few additional grams, but also kilograms might be involved. We do not know. This is an unpleasant development and it strengthens our doubts regarding their statements. Our long-term problem is: How much plutonium do they possess beyond the quantities already declared, and where is it?



The current conflict has a different background. Our inspections were stopped at the most important site—in the laboratory where used fuel rods are being separated and reprocessed. We were not allowed to carry out the required tests.

North Korea cited the fact that the inspectors demanded more than was stipulated in the agreement as one reason for its behavior. This is a completely unfounded accusation. At the moment there are no positive signs coming from Pyongyang.

**Bitzan:** Will there be any sanctions?

**Blix:** The initiative now lies with the UN Security Council. There is the firm wish among the Security Council to urge North Korea to allow the inspections. However, I do not think that there is currently a tendency toward sanctions. Nor do I believe that the United States is interested in a military escalation. It is making great efforts to explain that the "Patriots" are only of a defensive nature, and that they are only the response to the harsh language of the North.

**Bitzan:** North Korea has repeatedly threatened to leave the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Has this danger now increased?

**Blix:** North Korea has threatened to do so, but so far it has refrained from taking such a provocative step. However, this would not change the reality. The world wants to ensure that it cannot produce any nuclear weapons. The pressure on Pyongyang would be the same.

#### **IAEA's Kyd Says DPRK Pursuing 'Active' Nuclear Arms Program**

*AU0504130294 Paris AFP in English 1241 GMT 5 Apr 94*

[Excerpts] Vienna, April 5 (AFP)—North Korea's development of a second plutonium production line indicates that the Stalinist state is determined to pursue an "active programme" of nuclear weapons production, IAEA official David Kyd warned Tuesday [5 April].

Kyd said inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency visiting the radio-chemical laboratory at Yongbyon, 90 kilometres (55 miles) north of Pyongyang, last month had observed that a second plutonium separation line was being constructed, similar to the first line which was subject to IAEA monitoring.

The new line meant that the North Korean programme could evade effective monitoring, Kyd said.

"This is of concern to us," he said. "It means North Korea is pursuing an active programme, while the United States and the IAEA were hoping that it would put its nuclear activities on hold." [passage omitted]

Kyd said IAEA chief Hans Blix had verbally notified the IAEA governors of the discovery at a council meeting on March 21, and had also informed the UN Security Council.

The Security Council and IAEA officials were hoping a new mission could be sent to North Korea at the beginning of May, Kyd said. However there were currently no contacts between Pyongyang and the IAEA. [passage omitted]

#### **DPRK Envoy Says Nuke Development Intended To 'Restrain Japan'**

*SK0604120894 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 1100 GMT 6 Apr 94*

["YONHAP report from New Delhi"]

[Text] North Korean Ambassador to India Cha Pong-chu said today that North Korea has no intention to accept additional inspections even though the UN Security Council is demanding additional inspections on North Korea through its presidential statement.

Ambassador Cha made it clear today that North Korea has no intention to accept additional inspections by saying that North Korea had already shown everything that needed to be open, and that the International Atomic Energy Agency is making an unreasonable demand to North Korea even though it has been proven through inspections that there were no problems of nuclear weapons development.

Ambassador Cha also strongly implied the possibility of nuclear weapons development by North Korea by saying that it is no longer a secret that the ROK and Japan are developing nuclear weapons, and that Japan's nuclear armament is particularly a serious problem and if North Korea developed nuclear weapons, it would be basically to restrain [kyonje] Japan.

#### **Tokyo 'Unable To Confirm' Perry Claims on DPRK Nuke Program**

*PM0504140794 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Apr 94 First Edition p 6*

[ITAR-TASS report from the "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow" column: "Does North Korea Have a Specific Program?"]

[Text] Tokyo is unable to confirm the statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry that the DPRK has started implementing a program which will enable it to produce at least twelve nuclear devices a year within two to three years. An ITAR-TASS correspondent was informed of this by a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official.

He observed that he did not know the reasons which enabled the U.S. secretary of defense to make such a statement during an interview with a U.S. television company Sunday [3 April].

**IAEA Says Yongbyon Installations 'Camouflaged'**  
*AU0604123894 Vienna DER STANDARD in German*  
6 Apr 94 p 2

["voy"-signed report: "Covered With Soil and Plants for Camouflage"]

[Text] Vienna—"On 15 February, North Korea promised in writing that we could take samples and do tests in the radio chemical laboratory to make sure that no plutonium was taken out in the past 12 months. Without this promise, our inspectors would not have gone to North Korea in March," David Kyd, spokesman of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told DER STANDARD on Tuesday [5 April]. These samples are absolutely necessary since the seal has been broken and the checking devices installed by the IAEA have expired.

On the issue of using satellite photos, Kyd said that after the Gulf war, the IAEA Council of Governors adopted a written resolution saying that the IAEA shall be given access to all "additional information," which includes satellite photos, intelligence reports, and information by nuclear experts. After all, the experience with Iraq has shown that the declaration of nuclear installations by individual states is not sufficient. The Council of Governors' resolution applies to all states that have signed an inspection agreement with the IAEA, and this includes North Korea.

"South Africa did not oppose satellite photos," Kyd said. "But North Korea is annoyed because the photos come from the United States."

On the two mysterious installations in Yongbyon, Kyd said: "Satellite photos have shown that these installations were suddenly covered with soil and plants so they would be camouflaged before our first inspection in 1992. If they really are just military installations, then why are they not showing them to us?"

**Russian Envoy Questions Value of Team Spirit, Patriots**

*SK0104013594 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD*  
in English 1 Apr 94 p 2

[Text] Russian Ambassador to Seoul Georgiy F. Kunadze has warned that the South Korean decision to resume its joint military exercise with the United States, Team Spirit, and to deploy the Patriot antimissile system might be taken by North Korea as "provocative" and therefore, lead it to misjudge the South's real intentions.

"If they do see these steps as provocative, won't they make some final conclusions on the basis of that kind of opinion?" he said in an interview with THE KOREA HERALD.

The envoy also doubted whether the decision to take the steps would be effective in ensuring North Korea's full acceptance of international nuclear inspections.

"From the viewpoint of a citizen of a third country, I would say that I wonder about the strategic value and military importance of these exercises and these missiles to be introduced into South Korea," he said.

Kunadze called for more efforts toward a peaceful solution of the problem, saying that related countries still have time to explore additional possibilities to persuade North Korea to be "reasonable."

He said efforts not to further isolate North Korea are as important as strong and decisive actions against it.

But he does not agree with the so-called package deal between North Korea and the United States, which implies a linkage in negotiations.

"Out of my personal conviction as a diplomat and also a student of international relations, I'm not in favor of package deals. I'm not in favor of a linkage as a tool of diplomacy."

Russia, however, would not oppose a U.N. Security Council decision to impose punitive actions against North Korea, he said.

He said the council needs a consensus among members in order to decide any measures concerning Pyongyang's nuclear program.

The Russian government is not going to stand in the way of consensus at the council, "whatever this consensus is," the ambassador noted.

Kunadze came here in January but had been well-known in Korea before then. He had visited here six times as a senior researcher of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and as a vice foreign minister later.

He was one of the Russians who arranged Moscow visits in 1989 and 1990 by President Kim Yong-sam, who was then a political leader.

"My modest part can be described as facilitating the meetings between Mr. Kim Yong-sam and Soviet leaders," he said about his role.

Kunadze said the President said he would like to visit Moscow this year when he met him at Chongwadae in February to present his credentials. But he did not reveal when Kim plans to go to Moscow. Earlier reports said the visit will occur sometime in June.

The ambassador hoped that Seoul and Moscow conclude negotiations on financial compensation for the land that was owned by the Russian Legation from the end of the 19th century but now belongs to the Korean government or individuals before the President visits Russia.

Kunadze reaffirmed that Russia, despite its friendship and mutual assistance treaty with North Korea, would not help it if the Communist country attempted some kind of attack on another nation.

But he made it clear that Moscow would not discard the treaty, saying, "Russia, being a successor state to the former Soviet Union, is not in the position to abrogate any kind of international agreements" that it had concluded with others.

The treaty signed between the former Soviet Union and North Korea in the 1960s provides a security guarantee for North Korea in case of unprovoked attacks from the outside.

Kunadze claimed that this pact would not encourage North Korea to commit itself to any irresponsible behavior.

Concerning the issue of North Korean refugees who fled from logging camps in Siberia, the ambassador said Moscow has never been formally consulted by Seoul on that matter.

He said Russia would not object if South Korea decides to accept the refugees.

He said Moscow does not consider this issue in a political context but sees it as a matter related to human rights. He said Russian laws do not restrict travel by foreigners with valid passports, and therefore the Seoul government is the one which should make a decision.

The envoy called on South Koreans to study the Russian offers to repay Seoul's \$1.47 billion loans on a purely commercial basis.

He said in any commercial deal, what counts most are quality and price. That apparently includes deals in Russian weaponry provided it is competitive in price and good in quality.

"I do not think any political strings should be attached to the forthcoming deals either on the side of the Russian government or on the side of Koreans," he said.

He does not see any political obstacles to developing relations with Korea in any fields including military technology transfer, the envoy added.

#### Japanese Panel Discusses DPRK's Nuclear Issue

OW2703132694 Tokyo NHK General Television  
Network in Japanese 0000 GMT 27 Mar 94

[Roundtable "Discussion" program with Nobuo Matsunaga, government representative and former ambassador to the United States; Keio University Professors Masao Okonogi and Tomoyuki Kojima; Kan Indoku, chief of the ROK Far East Affairs Institute, in Seoul; Larry Nikshu, member of the U.S. Congress Research Bureau, in Washington; and William Taylor, deputy chief of the U.S. Strategic International Affairs Institute, in Seoul—all identified by caption, moderated by NHK commentator Takashi Yamamoto and reporter Sato]

[Excerpts] Yamamoto: Mr. Matsunaga, do you think the situation involving North Korea has returned to that of

a year ago when it announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], or has the situation worsened?

Matsunaga: As you know, tension in the world has now eased following the end of the Cold War. However, there are conflicts and disputes in various regions, and tension is now growing in certain places. I have the impression that tension on the Korean peninsula is mounting. While North Korea retracted its announcement on the withdrawal from the NPT, it took coercive actions. For this reason, I think the tension is now growing as compared with the situation a year ago. However, we should not lose our hope even under such circumstances. [passage omitted on remarks by other participants]

Yamamoto: Mr. Taylor said that North Korea is just engaging in its conventional diplomatic policies as it has done before. Mr. Matsunaga, why do you think North Korea rejected inspection of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency?

Matsunaga: I think the country is trying to display its diplomatic power by hinting at the possibility of its developing nuclear weapons. We need to consider why North Korea is trying to do so. I think its top priority task is to secure its existence and development. I believe that, to that end, it intends to make utmost use of the suspicion of its nuclear development program. The international community probably thinks North Korea's nuclear capability itself—when assumed that the nation possesses nuclear arms—is not relatively large. However, even if a nuclear weapon is a single-shot one, it will produce an unfathomable impact if it is used. For this reason, North Korea's suspected nuclear development involves danger. What is most important is that a certain misunderstanding or other factors will not serve as an impetus to the outbreak of some incidents. To that end, I think Japan, South Korea, the United States, China, and Russia need to make additional efforts to persuade North Korea to dispel suspicion about it. [passage omitted on remarks by other participants]

Yamamoto: We do not understand well why North Korea is trying to develop nuclear arms. What do you think of it?

Matsunaga: Mr. Okonogi stated earlier that he had thought North Korea was playing for time. I still believe it is just playing for time in view of its serious economic situation. While the political situation in North Korea is not reportedly bad, its economic situation is very serious. I have no choice but to say North Korea's economic power is rapidly declining in the East Asian region. Its greatest concern probably is to secure its existence. In that sense, its leaders have a feeling of crisis now. They think it will take much time to overcome this sense of crisis. Moreover, it is said that change of power will take place in North Korea from Kim Il-sung to Kim Chong-il. In this sense, North Korea is in a transition period. I think this is one of the reasons why they feel a growing sense of crisis. Then, why do they have to



prepare themselves for the change while feeling a sense of crisis? Well, Russia, China, the ROK, and Japan are North Korea's neighboring countries. Of them, Russia and China have nuclear weapons. Japan and the ROK, although they do not have nuclear weapons, are under the American nuclear umbrella. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the North Koreans think that there is great danger that this tension will continue to grow and eventually explode somewhere unless they do something about it.

**Yamamoto:** What does the international society have to do to deal with North Korea if that is the case?

**Matsunaga:** As Mr. Taylor has pointed out, I think that primarily, North Korea has to make its existence known to the international society and to seek development while cooperating with the international society. But, the North Korean leaders may be feeling that they do not have a chance to do that. I am sure they realize that the nuclear weapons development is not beneficial to North Korea at all. However, we can explain the current situation only from the viewpoint that they feel a sense of crisis.

**Sato:** I think that the ROK, although the United States withdrew its nuclear arms from there, feels that it is still under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The DPRK-USSR trade accord is actually invalid. It still has a trade agreement with China. Do you think North Korea feel unsafe in this situation?

**Matsunaga:** I do not think it does. North Korea cannot count on Russia, former Soviet Union. Its reliance on Russia is rapidly decreasing. China is the only remaining partner. I think, however, the North Korean leaders do not want to be placed completely under China's protection. I think they want to have a free hand.

**Yamamoto:** Now, I would like to move to the issue of how the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons will develop. Various negotiations are being held at the UN Security Council. Reporter Sato will explain how the things may develop. [passage omitted on Sato's explanations and remarks by other participants]

**Yamamoto:** Mr. Matsunaga, Japan and the ROK agreed at the summit talks that Japan, the ROK, China, and the United States have to cooperate to break the current deadlock. What role can Japan play in such a situation?

**Matsunaga:** As has been pointed out, I think it is correct for Japan, the ROK, and the United States to cooperate with each other to find out North Korea's true intentions. However, it is true also that China is the biggest influential power. This is very important in terms of two viewpoints. First, North Korea is in confrontational ties with Japan, the ROK, and the United States, although its ties with each of the three countries differ slightly. In this sense, Japan, the ROK, and the United States are not friendly countries to North Korea. However, China is

different. It has ties of friendship and trust with North Korea. Therefore, China has the strongest persuasive power.

Second, North Korea is relying 100 percent on China for energy, which is indispensable to North Korean economy. In this sense, China has a trump card. Therefore, I think it wields the strongest persuasive power. As Mr. Okonagi said, China's prestige will go up if it uses this trump card to change North Korea to act in a reasonable manner. The important thing is that we need to support China. I think Japan needs to think about cooperating with China.

As for the UN response to North Korea's suspected development of nuclear weapons, I think that discussions at the United Nations or the Security Council will have significant effect in terms of generating public opinion in the international community. Its policies are isolating North Korea in the international society. Its isolation is not beneficial at all to the international society as a whole. We need to bring it back to the international society. I think China has major influential power to do that, too. Therefore, Japan needs to assume the stand of supporting China.

**Yamamoto:** You mean that Japan needs to work with China, right?

**Matsunaga:** Yes, I mean to work with China.

**Yamamoto:** As we discussed earlier, the UN Security Council will gradually introduce necessary measures to deal with North Korea. How do you think Japan should respond if the Security Council asks it to join in economic sanctions against North Korea?

**Matsunaga:** Fundamentally speaking, Japan has to support 100 percent and cooperate with the United Nations if it decides to impose sanctions against North Korea. However, the reality is that we have to go through many steps before that. I also think there is a limit to the effect of sanctions. Therefore, I am of the opinion that we should not rely on sanctions alone. It is important for us to make efficient use of peaceful approaches, such as discussions and the persuasive power. [passage omitted on remarks by other participants]

**Yamamoto:** Mr. Matsunaga, it seems that Japan will be forced to make difficult decisions and be asked, depending on the situation in the future, to cooperate with the United Nations in military actions. What do you think of this issue?

**Matsunaga:** Japan is a U.S. ally. It made it clear that it would fully support and cooperate with the United States. But, it has to avoid the possibility of sending wrong signals to North Korea. On the other hand, Japan also fully supports the ROK's stance. I think we should continue to do that.

On the other hand, we hope for true peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. To realize that, Japan and North Korea need to normalize their diplomatic ties

first. We started negotiations for normalization of diplomatic ties between the two countries. But, the North Korean officials walked out of the negotiations two years ago. Needless to say, they have to take Japan's economic power into consideration. I think it is very important for North Korea to decide, on the basis of cool judgment, to return to the negotiation table for normalization of diplomatic ties. I think China hopes that, too.

**Yamamoto:** The time is up for us. Thank you very much for joining in this program.

#### **ROK Drilles on Discussion With PRC on DPRK Nuclear Issue**

SK3003125294

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of editorials carried by ROK vernacular newspapers on 30 March commenting on the ROK-China discussion on the North Korean nuclear issue.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "Does Our Position on the North Korean Nuclear Issue Change Again?"

The editorial refers to Chinese President Jiang Zemin's opposition to the resumption of the Team Spirit exercise and the deployment of Patriot missiles during his talks with ROK President Kim Yong-sam and writes: "This again shows that China consistently supports North Korea's position regarding the nuclear issue." The editorial asks the ROK Government to elaborate on what Jiang actually told President Kim Yong-sam during the talks and how the ROK responded to Jiang's remarks.

The editorial describes China's passive attitude toward international efforts to ensure North Korea's nuclear transparency and writes: "China turns a blind eye to the North Korean nuclear issue, which constitutes the most grave challenge to a post-cold war world, but intervenes, unfairly, into the ROK's defensive Team Spirit exercise and the deployment of Patriot missiles. We cannot understand this." The editorial writes the ROK's diplomacy has "lost its balance" by blindly believing that the resumption of the Team Spirit exercise may lead North Korea to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or that the adoption of a resolution at the UN Security Council may incite North Korea.

The moderate TONG-A ILBO carries on page 3 a 800-word editorial entitled "Truth and Falsehood of Chinese-Style Solutions."

Citing the fact that President Kim Yong-sam stressed the nuclear issue during his visit to Japan, while stressing economic cooperation during his visit to China, the editorial writes: "Even though the leaders of Japan and China may have felt comfortable because of such an attitude, President Kim Yong-sam failed to make the valuable opportunities to meet with the leaders of the two countries more valuable." Describing the U.S.-DPRK talks, a package deal, and the use of

persuasion regarding the North Korean nuclear issue as "Chinese-style solutions," the editorial writes that China's opposition to some points in a statement of the UN Security Council chairman is "disappointing" and describes China's opposition to the resumption of the Team Spirit exercise and the deployment of Patriot missiles during the summit talks as an "almost uncourteous act." The editorial concludes: "We are under the impression that our government relies on the Chinese-style solutions too heavily. It is necessary to examine whether China is using the North Korean nuclear issue as its diplomatic card."

The moderate CHUNGANG ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "Why Does the Policy on the North Korean Nuclear Issue Change Again?"

The editorial first describes the ROK's acceptance of China's preference for dialogue and its logic that "no one must incite North Korea" and writes that this means that the ROK was "persuaded" by China, instead of persuading China to accept the ROK's view. The editorial writes: "The ROK Government may have its own reason to change its nuclear policies. However, we cannot but express our worry that the chaos at home and abroad caused by this policy change may weaken the ROK's trustworthiness and cause a confusion in the security structure."

Citing ROK Ambassador to China Hwang Pyong-tae's remarks on the ROK's decision to discuss the nuclear issue with China, in addition to the United States, and to take joint action, the editorial writes this is "shocking" and may cause a "mess" in the ROK's diplomatic axis centering on the United States and Japan. After writing that all powerful countries in the ROK's neighborhood are competing to intervene in Korean peninsula affairs, the editorial concludes: "We already learned a century ago what invited competition among the powerful countries in our neighborhood and what resulted from that competition. Our country must not tremble in dealing with such important diplomatic issues as the North Korean nuclear issue."

#### **Bonn Welcomes Planned IAEA Inspections in Brazil, Argentina**

AU3003154994 Hamburg DPA in German 1329 GMT 30 Mar 94

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Bonn has reacted with satisfaction to the intention of Brazil and Argentina to have their nuclear facilities regularly inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna in the future. On Wednesday [30 March], well-informed circles referred to Germany's immediate interest, in view of scientific-technical cooperation with both countries in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Peter Kurt Wuerzbach, disarmament policy spokesman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian

Social Union [CSU] Bundestag Group, talked of a further important step to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, according to his information, Argentina, which, like Brazil, has not acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty so far, announced that it wants to accede to the treaty.

Precisely against the background of the topical discussion on access to the nuclear facilities in North Korea, the CDU/CSU Bundestag Group regards this development as significant progress and an important contribution to stabilization and confidence-building in the region, the politician stressed. IAEA spokesman David Kyd had announced in HANNOVERSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG that the control agreement with

Brazil and Argentina will come into force in late spring and the first inspections can take place in the middle of the year.

Above all German-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear sector, which was initiated in the seventies, continues to be controversial. The Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] repeatedly called for its abandonment because it feared that Brazil might work on the military use of nuclear power. This was repeatedly denied by the Federal Government. Originally, the German power plant builder Siemens-KWU [Kraftwerksunion] was supposed to build eight nuclear plants in the country. So far, the first plant "Angra II," whose construction was started as early as in 1976, has not yet been completed because of domestic policy problems. The enterprise supplied the power plant "Atucha" to Argentina.



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**4 MAY 1994**